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Abstract:
This dissertation studies the recent rise of extreme right-wing parties in the European context and
explores their origins of support and consequences of their presence. This project follows the
three-paper method, studying the movement from three distinct perspectives: immigration,
globalization, and party influence. Using a variety of data, I employ hierarchical modeling to test
hypotheses concerning these three areas in which extreme parties have an impact. My hypotheses
focus on the relationship changes in the local population and economic conditions have on the
support these parties receive, and how these parties modify the behavior of other right-wing
parties. My results indicate extreme right-wing party support is influenced by the size of
immigrant populations and the level of globalization in a region. I also find extreme right-wing
parties are capable of changing the preferences of center-right parties relative to their strength.
These results are important to our understanding of extreme right-wing parties, as they
demonstrate how they are able to achieve electoral success and their potential to alter the status
quo within party systems.
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INTRODUCTION

This research project studies the recent rise of extreme right-wing parties in the European
context. For this project, I chose to follow the three-paper method, studying the movement from
three distinct perspectives: immigration, globalization, and party influence. To accomplish this, I
have taken an approach to studying each aspect from a perspective which is uncommon in extant
literature. I will begin with an introduction that discusses the setting of the papers and my logic
for their design. This will be followed by the three papers, and I will tie together my findings in a
brief conclusion chapter at the end of the project.

Background
Recently, radical right-wing parties (RRWP) have dramatically increased their presence
and influence within democratic nations, especially in the European context. From the success
the National Front (FN) had in the 2017 French Presidential elections, to the arrival of the
Alternative for Germany party in the Bundestag, to the takeover of the Polish government by the
Law-and-Order party, Europe is undergoing an illiberal shift which poses a significant threat to
the highly institutionalized democracies that have been established there for decades. The source
of these changes, and their impacts, are multifaceted. In this work I explore these aspects of
RRWPs and add to the literature concerning RRWPs, authoritarianism, globalization, and party
behavior.
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Societies are in a constant state of change. People are moving in and out, businesses
come and go, political influences are ever changing. Consequently, new challenges emerge that
can alter the political landscape of a country, or even a continent. In the immediate aftermath of
WWII and the Nazi party, most European publics were rather opposed to any sort of nationalist
politics. In an attempt to understand how a people can be captured by such an extremist ideology,
many social scientists began to turn their research towards this phenomenon. The first to attempt
to explain public support for this authoritarian take over was Adorno et al. (1950). This work
established the modern study of authoritarianism and developed the F-scale, a tool for detecting
authoritarianism by studying personality traits.

As time progressed, fear of authoritarian political parties waned and public sentiment
against immigrants strengthened, opening the door for some fringe right-wing groups to gain
some electoral support. Modern RRWPs 1 began to gain electoral support in the late 1970s and
early 80s. The first RRWP to gain electoral seats in the national legislature after WWII, was the
FN in France, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen (Berenzin, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times, 2009).
Though, only successful for a short time until the 2000s, the FN confirmed the small, but
important, support of RRWPs and opened the door for their own and others’ success in the
future.

The global economic crisis of 2008 and the anti-government protests in the Middle East
and North Africa created a second wave of mass immigration. This wave created a humanitarian

1

Modern RRWPs are defined as those which gained electoral support post WWII. Support for RRWPs never truly
went away, as much as it was hidden more or less effectively. Many former Nazi’s were able to hide out in minor
parties such as the FPO of Austria, however they were careful to keep their right-wing agendas fairly close to the
vest (Lothar, H, 2003).
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crisis within European countries. As millions from neighboring regions poured into Europe,
politicians and publics were forced to decide how to react to such a large influx of new
immigrants and refugees.

These new arrivals elicited a variety of responses from the people, parties, and rulers of
Europe. Some, like Merkel of Germany, met them with open arms. Others, such as Hungary,
Macedonia, and Norway, placed walls on their borders to prevent illegal immigration. Austria
went as far to erect barriers on its borders with other members of the European Union, a direct
violation of the Schengen Area and international asylum law. The impact of these new arrivals,
and the impetus for adopting such policies, was a strong rise in support of RRWPs.

As publics began to push back against Centrist government positions, leaders were faced
with the choice of supporting liberal institutions, such as asylum laws, or curtailing the influence
of extremist parties and enacting policies limiting the rights of migrants. Other examples of
illiberal policy choices will be discussed further in Chapter 3. These policy choices continue into
the 2020s with immigrants and refugees paying the cost of xenophobic publics and politicians
willing to provide them a voice.

At the same time Europe was being hit with waves of immigrants and refugees, another
force, economic globalization, was establishing itself on the continent. As the breakup of the
Soviet Union created an opportunity for the movement of people in the 1990s, it also created
business opportunities for foreign firms. From the perspective of American and European
political leaders, this was also an opportunity to expand international trade agreements, providing
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better and cheaper goods for their constituents. This shift towards neoliberal economic policies
allowed American corporations to increase their presence in European countries, bringing its
culture with them.

The appearance of some of these American firms was not always met with as much of a
welcoming attitude as many would expect. The arrival of these businesses, such as fast food in
France, was, instead, met with quite a bit of hostility. The French even created a word for fast
food, malbouffe. Though fast food initially arrived in Europe in 1972, it blossomed in the early
1990’s, with a bevy of multi-national corporations (MNCs) attempting to enter the market.
However, despite the efforts of these firms, many only saw marginal success. Several of these
MNCs have made a second attempt to break into the European food market, which will be
discussed in the second chapter.

Globalization in general has been met with quite a bit of hostility in recent years.
Following the initial wave of expanded trade, many Europeans developed a healthy skepticism of
globalization after they discovered many manufacturing jobs were shipped overseas. This,
combined with increases in immigration and growing inequality, has led to increased support for
anti-globalization and protectionist policies often championed by RRWPs (Burgoon et al., 2017)

Focus and Scope
This project focuses on right-wing attitudes, the foundation of political support, and
impact of RRWPs in the European context. It consists of three chapters of interrelated works,
each focusing on a different aspect of these concepts. In this work I seek to bring a better
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understanding of how changes in European societies have modified the political landscape to
favor these parties and the impact these changes have had.

The first chapter in this work centers on the German public and its response to the recent
waves of immigrants from outside the European Union. To measure the impact of immigrant
population size on nativist attitudes, I use data available from the European Social Survey to
construct scales that allow me to gauge changes in public sentiment towards immigrants. This
data covers the time period from 2002-2018, which covers the two main waves of immigration
Europe has recently experienced.

The German setting of this paper is of particular interest for several reasons. First,
Germany is the largest state within the EU, and is often looked to for leadership by other member
states (Janning, J. & Moller, A., 2016). Therefore, Germany has the ability to set the tone for the
European response to a crisis, humanitarian or otherwise. Second, Germany has a strong history
of authoritarian behavior, obviously. In fact, the modern study of authoritarianism began with the
works of Adorno et al (1950), as they sought to understand the phenomenon of the Nazi party.

In addition to the role and history of Germany, it also received the most refugees of any
European country during the most recent crisis. The combination of these three elements
provides an excellent opportunity to study the interaction of authoritarian attitudes and
immigrant population size.

5

The second chapter changes the setting and focus to study the relationship between
globalization and the support for RRWPs. This chapter is focused on the population of
(mainland) France and the correlation between the arrival of foreign corporations and changes in
support for RRWPs. I use the presence of Burger King restaurants as a proxy for the level of
globalization and measure for changes in support for RRWPs. I will discuss this choice of an
MNC as a marker for globalization later in the work. This study considers the changes of support
for RRWPs between the first round of the French presidential elections in 2012 and 2017.

This paper seeks to study the impact international corporations can have on the level of
cultural threat felt by local populations. I chose France as the setting for this paper due to the
importance of the culinary arts to the French national identity. The encroachment of foreign food
MNCs provides a source of threat previously not considered when studying support for RRWPs.
The expansion of these MNCs, such as Burger King, with the exception of McDonald’s, has
been fairly limited until recently. Prior to the last decade, most of the food MNCs have been
located primarily in the major French cities such as Paris and Lyon. Only recently have they
branched out to smaller markets, and Burger King has led the charge. The goal of this chapter is
to determine what, if any, effect this expansion has had on public support for RRWPs.

The third chapter considers the impact the RRWPs have on the party systems in Europe.
In this chapter I ask the question, “under what circumstances do RRWPs affect the policy
positions of center-right parties?” The data in this set come from the Manifestos Project and are
limited to the years since 1994. I chose this date as it was the first year in which a RRWP was
elected to a national legislature in Europe following WWII. I also limit the scope by including
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only those states which are members of the OECD, as non-OECD states have parties which are
highly related to ethnic groups.

Usually, the research perspective when describing the relationship between mainstream
and RRWPs focuses on the shortcomings of center-right parties; often asking what the
mainstream parties are doing wrong to drive support away from them and to the extreme. This
paper counters this perspective by considering the impact of RRWPs, their varying size and
strength, and how they can cause mainstream parties to shift their preferences.

Relevance, Questions, and Objectives
The central aim of this research project is to explore the motivations for support and the
impact potential of RRWPs in the European setting. The slow burn and then explosion of support
for these parties has created a unique opportunity for researchers to understand how these groups
have been able to shift consolidated advanced democracies towards the consideration and
implementation of illiberal policies. To do this, I have developed a research agenda that focuses
on the issues from three distinct perspectives. First, I measure the impact of shifting immigrant
population sizes has on native preferences towards this group. Second, I shift the focus from
people groups to MNCs, to consider their impact on the support for nationalist parties. Finally, I
study the consequences of RRWP success on the preferences of center-right parties towards
right-wing policy positions.

7

Chapter 1: Authoritarianism and Germany
The first chapter in this work analyzes the relationship between authoritarian attitudes,
immigrant population size, and native populations preferences towards immigrants. In this
chapter I ask the question, how have authoritarianism and contact theory played a role in the
attitudes of German citizens when confronted by large scale changes in the population of
immigrants? It is undeniable that the multiple waves of immigrants Germany has experienced in
the previous three decades has had an impact on the preferences of the people. In this chapter, I
am trying to ascertain what exactly those preferential shifts are.

This research question is an important one to ask for several reasons. First, this topic has
practical importance. The immigration scenario occurring right now in Europe is a permanent
change European citizens are going to have to deal with. The Syrian civil war absolutely
devastated the country, its infrastructure left in ruins. The refugees from Syria have little to
return home to. Many refugees, seeing themselves as stateless, left with the intention of never
returning, their main goal being finding a new country in which to start over (Tucker, 2018).
This chapter helps us better understand the way in which interaction, or the lack thereof,
contributes towards the development of native preferences and assessments of migrants. This
knowledge can lead to more informed choices by those in place to make decisions concerning
policy options.
Second, this work builds on the literature surrounding authoritarian attitudes, their
development, and the role cross-cultural interaction has on them. More specifically, I focus on
submissive authoritarians, an understudied portion of the authoritarian personality. Prior work,
such as the F-scale (Adorno et al., 1950) and the RWA scale (Altemeyer, Right-wing
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Authoritarianism, 1981), was flawed in that the scales were designed to skew towards the
detection of aggressive authoritarian attitudes. The scale I develop for this chapter focuses on
submissive authoritarian traits such as preferences for acting properly, following the rules, and
the government providing safety. This study focuses on the shift in authoritarian attitudes that
occurs when the status quo has been disturbed by a sudden change, such as the arrival of a large
new cultural group to a country or region.

In addition to authoritarianism, this chapter also adds to the literature surrounding
Contact Theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998, 2016). I use contact theory to test the impact of
intergroup interactions on the assessment of immigrants by Germans with varying levels of
authoritarianism. By adding to the understanding of how interactions between established and
new people groups can help explain preferences for outgroup members, this work exemplifies
the importance of encouraging opportunities for disparate groups to interact.

I propose three hypotheses to answer my research question in this chapter. First,
hypothesis 1 states: I predict that those respondents reporting higher levels of submissive
authoritarian personality traits will also report lower levels of preferences towards immigrant
populations. Given submissive authoritarians predilection towards the maintenance of the status
quo (Feldman & Stenner 1997, Feldman 2003, Passini 2017), I argue the sudden increase in
immigrant population size within German Lander will be sufficient to trigger authoritarian
attitudes in an otherwise tolerant group of people. This triggering of authoritarian attitudes will
then lead to a negative appraisal of immigrants within the submissive authoritarian population.

9

Hypothesis 2 focuses on contact theory. It states: those respondents living in areas with
larger increases in immigrant populations will evaluate immigrants as being more beneficial to
society. In line with the theory, I expect larger populations of immigrants will lead to an
increased level of interaction between the native and immigrant populations. Though early work
claimed the necessity of goal-oriented interaction (Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, 1954) to
reduce intergroup hostility, later work has emphasized that there only be sustained interaction
between groups to lessen intergroup tension (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

In this chapter I argue that Lander with higher percentages of immigrant populations
foster increased interaction between groups in the aggregate. However, submissive authoritarians
may have certain traits that prevent these helpful interactions. It is not in the nature of
authoritarians to seek out new experiences or to be open to new experiences. This group is
focused on the status quo and abhor violations of it. I predict that it is far more likely that
submissive authoritarians with intentionally avoid interactions with immigrant groups, robbing
themselves of the opportunity to reevaluate their preferences (Pettigrew 2016, Hassen 1987,
Oesterreich 2005).

The data with which I test these hypotheses come from the European Social Survey from
the years 2002-2018 (9 waves). I restrict the data to include only German citizens, as it is their
preferences with which I am concerned. I construct two scales to test my hypotheses, the
dependent variable and the main explanatory variable. The dependent variable measures
preferences for immigrants, while the main explanatory variable captures submissive
authoritarian personality traits.
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The other main data used in the model are population data. I retrieved immigrant
population data from the United Nations and German population data from the German
government website. Because I expect there to be variation in population sizes between Lander
and between years, I employ a hierarchical model; Lander being the first level and year the
second. I control for various demographic variables, such as age, education, employment status.

Chapter 2: Fast food and French culture
Most current research, including the first chapter in this work, considers the impacts and
effects of globalization on the attitudes of the public, focuses on the movement of people from
one region or country to another. The second chapter seeks to fill a gap left by those other efforts
to explain the role of economic globalization on public support for RRWPs. The common
argument against globalization by RRWPs is centered around the loss of jobs and depressed
wages brought on by globalization. I am looking at a different angle to the puzzle. By studying
the arrival of food MNCs, I am shifting the point of view of the research to consider the impact
of foreign corporations on the level of cultural threat experienced by local populations. In this
chapter I argue the arrival of cultural icons such as McDonalds, Walmart, and Burger King,
create a level of cultural threat among the populations of host nations. Food is intrinsic to the
culture of a nation. It, and its preparation, are institutions within local cultures that help give
members their identity (Jensen et al, 2011). The incursion of fast food into new markets poses a
new threat to the cultural identity of those places. This threat then leads to support of RRWPs via
their anti-globalization platform.
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This chapter is important for two main reasons. First, it fills a research gap left by other
scholars studying RRWPs. The majority of research into this family of parties examines the
impact of immigrants and the level of cultural and economic threat they generate. Less research
is directed towards the cultural consequences of the arrival of MNCs, particularly those in the
food services sector. This chapter seeks to help fill this void by uncovering the relationship
between the arrival of foreign food producers and support for RRWPs.

Second, the setting of France offers a unique opportunity to study globalization and
RRWP support. The 2017 French Presidential election, the timeframe with which this chapter is
concerned, featured a strong discussion about the consequences of globalization and the loss of
French culture. The success the FN had in the 2017 election was strongly influenced by an antiglobalization platform, centering on the recent cultural erosion experienced by the French
people. Le Pen tried to emphasize that France’s long history as a cultural center of the world was
being threatened by the arrival of foreign people and corporations. She argued for increasing
protections for French culture and economic security. The public embraced her anti-globalization
rhetoric, voting her into the second round of elections in 2017.

I study the relationship between RRWP support and level of globalization via three
hypotheses. The first, those electoral districts with Burger King restaurants present will present
lower levels of electoral support for RRWP than areas without. I expect that fast food MNCs will
have done an appropriate amount of market research into the susceptibility of the local markets,
and will, therefore, select those places with the least amount of aversion to their arrival. I argue
that the arrival of these MNCs in less supportive areas would trigger defensive cognitive
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reactions in the local population as they would perceive them as icons of a foreign culture coexisting within their own cultural spaces (Chen and Chui, 2010). This visual interaction would
prime their minds to perceive competition between the two cultures, resulting in negative
attitudes toward the foreign cultural entity (Torelli and Cheng, 2011). Therefore, the MNCs
choose locations with better potential for success.

Hypothesis 2 considers a possible interactive effect between the arrival of a fast food
MNC and the level of immigration present in that commune. This hypothesis, those electoral
districts without Burger King restaurants and low levels of immigration will present higher levels
of electoral support for RRWPs, tests the level of exposure to fast food MNCs and immigrant
population size. Changes in the power dynamics between groups can create an elevated level of
anxiety in the dominant group (Tajfel, 1982; Stephan & Stephan, 2013), known as realistic
threat. This is the exact situation faced in France following the immigration crisis of 2015 in the
context of the Schengen area. Realistic threat theory postulates that large influxes of immigrant
populations create concerns within native populations that they would now be in competition
with immigrants for scarce resources such as jobs and welfare (Quillian, 1995). Due to reduced
opportunities for exposure and interaction (Allport, 1950; Pettigrew, 1998), I argue that low
levels of immigrant population and the lack of a Burger King will increase support for RRWPs.

My final hypothesis, those electoral districts without Burger King restaurants and high
levels of unemployment will present higher levels of electoral support for RRWPs, measures the
role of a common driver for the support of RRWPs, unemployment (Jackman & Volpert, 1996)
along with the level of globalization in a commune. Economic losers due to globalization have
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been a recent target of the FN. They and other RRWPs in Europe have developed economic
strategies designed to exploit those most effected by offering support to welfare chauvinism
(Achterberg et al., 2011) and developing slogans such as “France First.” I include this hypothesis
to test for the strength of globalization as an indicator for cultural threat and support for RRWPs.
A significant result of this test would indicate the level of globalization is working with
economic fears, driving RRWP support.

This study uses the results of the first round of the 2017 French presidential election as
the dependent variable, which is a combined total of the percentage of votes for the four RRWPs
receiving votes during that election. I use a hierarchical model for analysis as the data exist at
two different levels. The bulk of the data comes from the commune level; however, some is only
available at the province level, therefore, the nesting of observations becomes necessary.

The dependent variable in this study is the combined voting percentage for all four
RRWPs in the 2017 election. Burger King restaurant data comes from the Burger King France
website and is available at the commune level. Election, population, and unemployment data
comes directly from the French government website. I control for previous RRWP support from
the 2012 election, as well as unemployment and immigration level in all models.

Chapter 3: Illiberal influences
In the last decade, Europe has experienced an electoral trend in which RRWPs have
gained significant political support. When these parties gain governing power, they create
illiberal change in their societies. In Poland and Hungary, RRWPs have become the ruling
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parties, making sweeping changes to consolidate power and restrict minority freedoms. These
policy choices clearly have a negative impact on the democratic processes in their countries. But
what happens when RRWPs are not in government, but instead, see a general increase in
support? Does the increase in support for RRWPs create an incentive in center-right parties to
adopt right-wing policy options? In this paper I explore the impact these parties have had on their
center-right counter parts as they compete for electoral support. I ask the question, under what
circumstances do RRWPs effect the policy positions of center-right parties?

My first hypothesis in this chapter is center-right parties’ ideological shift to the right will
be relative to vote share earned by RRWPs in the previous election. I argue that established
center-right parties should be unwilling to make shifts to the right, unless they have been victims
of support loss to RRWPs in previous elections. As Somer-Topcu (2009) argues, losses in
previous elections predict greater risk acceptant behavior in subsequent elections on the part of
party leadership. Without this incentive to alter policy positions, it is in the interest of centerright parties to maintain consistent party positions (Downs, 1957).
Hypotheses 2 and 2a focus on the likelihood a center-right party will adopt far-right
policy choices based on the number of parties in the system and the relative strength of far-right
parties. Hypothesis 2 states: Center right parties will seek to maintain a consistent ideological
positioning when they are not threatened by extremist parties. The electoral center of most
countries has been developed over multiple iterations of elections in which dominant parties
have been able to carve out their own space on the political spectrum. In Europe, this is typified,
generally, by the major parties creating a space within the center of the spectrum in which they
are fairly similar in the policy options they offer, and those options are acceptable to a majority
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of the public (Norris, 2005). I argue that it is unlikely to observe much change in the established
policy preferences for center-right parties when the party system is unaffected by a center-right
parties will seek to maintain a consistent ideological positioning when they are not threatened by
extremist parties. Center-right parties will seek to maintain a consistent ideological positioning
when they are not threatened by extremist parties.

However, the preferences of center-right parties may change given a viable threat from
the far right when there is increased uncertainty in the electoral system. Hypothesis 2a states:
Center-right parties’ ideological shift will be conditioned by the percentage of votes received by
RRWPs in the previous election and the effective number of parties in the system. I argue
systems with lower thresholds for entry into the legislature are more sensitive to the emergence
of far-right parties for two reasons. First, parties in systems with low thresholds are sensitive to
the success of other parties in their same family, as this is who they generally compete with for
votes (Adams, J. & Somer-Topcu, Z., 2009). And second, previous electoral success by RRWPs
sends signals about the true nature of voter preferences, allowing for more informed decision
making by party leaders (Monogan, 2012).

Hypotheses 3 and 3a focus on the ideological impact of the governing status of centerright parties and their likelihood of policy shifts when confronted by strong RRWPs. Hypothesis
3, center-right parties’ ideological shift is moderated by their participation in the government,
tests the theory that governing status is a moderating influence on the policy positions of parties.
Moderate positioning by centrist parties is crucial to increasing the likelihood that these parties
will be attractive candidates for coalition formation (Dandoy, 2014). Hypothesis 3a, center-right
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parties’ ideological shift will be conditioned by their role in the government and the percentage
of votes received by RRWPs in the previous election, tests the strength of their preferences when
faced with strong RRWP opposition. I argue that in those systems in which there is a strong
RRWP presence, the governing center-right party will respond to this threat by moving to the
right. The strong RRWP performance provides information to the center-right party about the
true nature of the electorate. They should then respond with an ideological shift relative to the
strength of the RRWP.

The data for this project come primarily from the Manifestos Project. I restrict the data to
European OECD members who are classified as center-right, as I am concerned with their shifts
in policy positions. I also limit the dataset to include effective parties, defined as those parties
winning seats in their country’s legislature. The dependent variable for this study is the policy
position of the center-right party.
I employ three explanatory variables to test the three series of hypotheses. The first
hypothesis is tested using a dichotomous variable identifying the presences of an effective
RRWP within the system. Hypotheses 2 and 2a are tested using the absolute strength of the
largest RRWP in the country’s political system. Hypotheses 3 and 3a also use RRWP party
strength to measure RRWP influence, but here it is interacted with the center-right party’s
governing status, which is a dichotomous variable.

This study employs time series cross-sectional models using an OLS estimator. As a
party’s left/right placement in period t are highly correlated with their placement in period t-1, I
include a lagged dependent variable in all models. This lagged variable is included to help
17

control for serial correlation (Abou-Chadi, 2016). In an effort to control for heterogeneity, I
employ a random effects model, controlling for correlation among countries and parties.

The remainder of this work proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 studies the impact of the
relative size of immigrant population, and interaction with them, on the preferences of German
citizens. Chapter 2 discusses the relationship between economic globalization and cultural threat
among the French electorate. Chapter 3 explores the impact RRWPs have on their center-right
counterparts. Finally, in the conclusion I will discuss my results and their implications.
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CHAPTER 1
AUTHORITARIANISM AND GERMANY: A STUDY OF
NATIVIST ATTITUDES
Introduction
On October 17th, 2015, the day before local elections were to be held in Cologne,
Germany, Henriette Reker, independent candidate for the mayor, was attacked and stabbed in the
neck and stomach. While the attack was taking place, the perpetrator was witnessed to have
yelled about the current influx of refugees. The attacker was reported to have been motivated by
xenophobic attitudes and chose Reker due to her governmental responsibilities of the housing
and integration of immigrants and refugees (Deardon, 2015). Reker would go on to win the
election while in the hospital recovering from her wounds, but the anti-immigrant sentiment
espoused by her assailant remains active in the population.

Changes in the societal status quo affect change in people’s political attitudes in various
ways. For some, this change is met with open arms. The influx of new people groups represents
an enrichment of the local culture and an improvement to society in general. However, not all
people are as enthusiastic about the arrival of new cultures and their potential effect on the status
quo. Instead, some fear the change new groups can bring. They often meet these changes with
hostility and are supportive of policy that limits the impact of these societal changes. This paper
askes the question, how have authoritarianism and contact theory played a role in the attitudes of
German citizens when confronted by large scale changes in the population immigrants? Due to
19

myriad crises in the past two decades vast numbers of immigrants and refugees have migrated
into Europe from the MENA region, with Germany being one of the main destinations.

The German case in this immigration crisis is of particular interest for several reasons.
First, Germany, as the largest economy in Europe, is a leader among European nations. Of all the
states within the EU, Germany is often the first state other member states look to for leadership
in foreign policy, security and defense (Janning, J. & Moller, A., 2016). This status as a leader
makes Germany a focal point for the region concerning immigration due to its evolving policy.
Also, Germany’s history with authoritarianism is well known. They study of authoritarian
attitudes began with Adorno et al. (1950) as an attempt to understand the behavior and influence
of the Nazi party following WWII. Given the current role of Germany on the world stage, a
strengthening in internal illiberal influences, and the country’s past experiences with
authoritarianism, Germany seems a natural place to look when considering the contemporary
impact of these attitudes.

Germany has a mixed history with immigration since the end of the Second World War.
Immediately following the war, the country faced a shortage of labor in its efforts to rebuild.
With the absence of so many men, the country’s leadership looked to immigration to help reduce
this shortage (Ireland, 1997). This resulted in a large influx of men providing cheap, unskilled
labor. Initially, these men were expected to work and then leave. However, in reality, the
workers stayed in Germany and their families began to follow them. While this primary
immigration was welcomed at first, the subsequent secondary immigration of wives, children and
extended families began to become a burden on the state. Beginning in the late 1960’s, this
20

policy of recruitment changed to one of zero-immigration and the restriction of immigrant rights
(Joppke, 1998).

Germany has been on a path of immigrant inclusion since 1990 with establishment of the
“Foreigner Law of 1990.” This law consolidated previous court rulings to create a statutory
precedent granting significant rights to immigrants. The Foreigner Law established immigration
rights for spouses and children of the men working in Germany, granted freedom of travel for
second and third generation foreigners, and children of immigrants would no longer have a
waiting period to marry. Despite these legal advancements, anti-immigrant sentiment still had a
foothold within the native population.

Following unification and the downfall of communism, Germany faced many new
challenges surrounding immigration. Competition for jobs and resources grew at an exponential
rate due to East Germans joining the labor pool. This coupled with an enormous influx of asylum
seekers, created a social environment extremely hostile to immigrants (Ireland, 1997). In 1995
alone, nearly 4,000 hate crimes were committed against immigrants by German right-wing
extremists (Migration News Sheet, 1995).

In 1999 Chancellor Schroder and the Social Democrat (SPD)/Green party government
continued the liberalization of the Germany immigration policy. Through a series of incremental
adjustments to the German immigration policy, the concept of becoming a country of
immigration began to take hold; moving from a theory of kein Einwanderungland (not a country
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of immigration), to one that embraces it (Bergfeld, 2017). The culmination of this movement
towards a more open immigration policy occurred in 2015, when the German government, led by
Angela Merkel, announced a plan to accept refugees from the Syrian civil war (Bosweel, C. &
Hampshire, J., 2016). However, Merkel’s welcoming attitude towards those displaced by
violence has been somewhat at odds with a large number of her fellow European leaders and
even those in her own coalition. Soon after this event the CDU leadership publicly challenged
Merkel’s position and the AfD began to receive significantly higher support in polls (Benecek,
D. and Strasheim, J., 2016).

The public response to the recent
wave of immigration has also been
mixed. While some, like Merkel, rushed
to support those seeking shelter in
Germany, other German political actors
had much more negative reactions. For
example, beginning in 2014 the group
Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamification of the West (PEGIDA) began holding rallies
every Monday night in the east German city of Dresden, an Alternative for Germany (AfD)
stronghold (“Far Right Critics Hold Rallies,” 2109). After enduring five years of weekly rallies
led by PEGIDA and supported by the AfD, often with AfD leadership in attendance, the city
declared a Nazi emergency (Winter, 2019). Although it was a non-binding resolution, the
declaration acts as a reminder and a warning concerning the potential of such groups.
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This paper is concerned with the attitudes native Germans have towards immigrant
populations. Utilizing data from the European Social Survey (ESS) I will explore the relationship
between submissive authoritarianism and anti-immigrant sentiment. I hypothesize that those
respondents scoring higher in submissive authoritarian attitudes will have increasingly negative
perceptions of immigrants. I also predict, via contact theory, consistent exposure to large
numbers of immigrants will encourage all portions of the population to report higher levels of
preferences towards immigrants. Also, though this positive shift will affect the entire population,
it will be diminished in those respondents with authoritarian attitudes. My results indicate
support for these hypotheses indicating an overall positive change in preferences towards
immigrants throughout the population.

This paper will proceed as follows. First, I discuss the role of cultural threat exerts on the
activation of authoritarian attitudes within a native population. Then I will discuss the role of
contact theory on opinions of outgroup members. This will be followed by a presentation of the
data and an analysis of results. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of the implications of
my findings and ideas for future research.

The Role of Authoritarians
The study of authoritarianism began as an attempt to understand how fascism and Nazism
were able to garner such widespread support in the first half of the twentieth century. The
development of the F-scale by Adorno et al. (1950) defined right-wing authoritarianism as set of
personality traits which, combined, would lend one towards an authoritarian disposition. Adorno
argued that those predisposed to these behavioral traits are overly prejudiced and aggressive
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towards minorities and “particularly susceptible to anti-democratic propaganda” (Adorno et al.
1950, p.1) Though flawed, this work created a foundation for future research on the motivations
and personality traits of right-wing authoritarians (RWA).

More recently, the predominant method for measuring RWA is the tripartite scale
developed by Altemeyer (1981, 1996). This scale identifies RWA as a covariation of three
behavioral traits: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism.
Authoritarian submission is characterized by personality traits which support social cohesion
over the importance of individual liberty (Feldman, 2003). Those who typically score highly on
authoritarian submission tests place high importance on the maintenance of the status quo and
are quick to conform to the preferences of leaders. This group’s motivations are driven by fear,
triggering defensive behaviors aimed at maintaining social control (Van Heil et al., 2004).

This behavior is exemplified by support of President Trump’s anti-immigrant policy
choices. Submissive authoritarians are supportive of these policies, such as building a wall along
the southern U.S. border and the banning of immigrants from Islamic nations, because they fear
the potential for the changing of American cultural norms. Supporting policy positions like this
one, and political leaders that espouse them, allow submissive authoritarians to ‘fight back’
against the threats they experience without any overt action.

Aggressive authoritarians, on the other hand, are actively aggressive towards those who
threaten social order. They are also highly supportive of actions by the authorities that punish
those who they consider threats to the status quo. However, unlike Altemeyer, Feldman (2003)
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argues these aggressive authoritarians are not likely to exhibit these behaviors outside the
presence of a perceived threat from an out-group. These attitudes and behavior should only be
exhibited in the presence of a perceived threat to the status quo.

Those classified as conventionalists are focused on traditional values. They are highly
sensitive to changes in established societal institutions (Duckit & Bizumic, 2013). These
attitudes are triggered when conventionalists sense that the old-fashioned way of doing things is
being altered by another group.

Early work employing the RWA scale utilized it as a unidimensional scale, which was
heavily weighted towards those expressing authoritarian aggression and conventionalism traits
(Duckitt et al., 2010), thus diminishing the role of submissive authoritarians. Submissive
authoritarians’ preferences for obedience to leaders (Feldman, 2003) includes a latent aggression
towards non-conformists which may not be detectable via RWA tests absent a perceived threat
(Passini, 2017). The uneven balancing of this scale has led to criticism of it as an effective tool to
measure authoritarianism, and an argument has been made to measure all three dimensions
separately (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Feldman, 2003; Funke, 2005; Duckitt & Bizumic 2013). A
major issue with treating RWA as a unidimensional variable, is that there is no differentiation
among the components of the scale. By combining all three authoritarian components into one
scale the researcher is unaware of which dimension is driving the scores. A respondent
presenting high scores in authoritarian submission is treated the same as a respondent presenting
high aggression or conventionalism scores. The results, therefore, are unclear as to which type of
authoritarian attitudes have been triggered in the population. As most work previously has
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focused on either the traditional RWA scale or aggressive authoritarianism, it is prudent to also
consider the role of submissive authoritarians and the impact they have on the political climate of
a county. Their impact my differ from the other categories of authoritarians, in that they have the
potential to be a large voting bloc. While they may not be as likely to take to the streets in protest
of cultural shifts, they can be counted on to show up to the ballot box once activated.

This study focuses on submissive authoritarian attitudes. The data, which is discussed in
a later section, comes from the European Social Survey which includes items throughout its
waves which are effective at capturing the submissive authoritarian mindset. These questions
focus on the importance of acting properly, following the rules, and the government providing
safety.

The key component to the triggering of these attitudes towards nonconformists is a
perceived threat to the natural order of social cohesion. Submissive authoritarians should not be
expected to display a significant level of prejudicial attitudes as long as the status quo is
perceived (Feldman & Stenner 1997, Feldman 2003, Passini 2017). However, in the presence of
a significant threat to the societal status quo, such as large shifts in the immigrant population, it
should be expected that submissive authoritarians will exhibit negative attitudes and behavior
towards those people groups identified as presenting the threat. Therefore, (H1) I predict that
those respondents reporting higher levels of submissive authoritarian personality traits will also
report lower ratings of immigrant populations.

Contact Theory and Immigration
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It is not always the case that the interaction between cultures will lead to negative
attitudes towards one another. While those possessing authoritarian attitudes can feel threatened
due to a change in the societal status quo, other factors can impact evaluations of out-groups.
Contact theory (Allport 1954, Pettigrew 1998) may provide a mediating force in a society when
it is presented with a large shift in its cultural makeup. Initially addressing relationships between
Whites and African-Americans in the United States (Brophy 1946, Williams, 1947, Kephart
1957), contact theory has been expanded to study a variety of intergroup relationships such as the
inclusion of disabled children in mainstream classrooms (Harper & Wacker, 1985),
reconciliation post-civil war (Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008), and attitudes towards
transgender rights (Tadlock et al., 2017). I employ this theory to test the impact of intergroup
contact between native Germans and immigrants in the face of large-scale changes in the
immigrant population.

Contact theory argues that repeated interactions with members of outgroups can serve to
reduce prejudices and alleviate concerns of cultural threat (Allport 1954, Voci et al. 2015).
Allport (1954) argued those interactions would need to exist in a very specified set of
circumstances. As competition has the ability to heighten awareness of differences between
groups, the interaction must occur outside of a competitive setting, such as co-workers trying to
complete a project. Second, the contact must be sustained. Occasional meetings and exchanged
pleasantries do not meet the requirements set forth by Allport. Interactions need to be consistent
and meaningful. Third, the contact must be one on one and the status of the individual must be
equal. The interaction between doctor and patient or employer and employee is not sufficient to
meet Allport’s conditions (Jackman & Crane, 1986). In order for contact theory to apply to the
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interaction, the two people cannot have a disparate power dynamic. Equal standing for each
person and personal interaction is required to break down barriers related to out-group bias.

Also, signaling from authorities that the outgroup is in some way beneficial to the success
of society can have positive effects on outgroup preferences when it establishes norms of
acceptance. This strength of this conclusion is drawn into question by more recent research.
Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) show those interactions which included some of these structured
requirements do significantly improve outgroup preferences more than non-structured
interactions. However, non-structured interactions are still related to a negative relationship
between outgroup contact and prejudice. Therefore, while Allport’s preconditions to contact
theory’s success are not requirements for improved preferences, they seem to amplify the effects
of intergroup contact in a positive manner.

The data used in this study (discussed in the following section) are not sufficiently
focused to determine the type or frequency of interaction. This is due to the fact that the smallest
division of respondents is at the Lander (state) size. This limits my ability to make assumptions
about the specific types of interactions between native and immigrant interactions, per Allport’s
theory concerning structured vs non-structured interactions. However, Pettigrew and Tropp’s
(2006) conclusions concerning general interactions between people groups inform my theory in
that those natives in Lander experiencing larger flows of immigrants, as a percentage of the
population, should have higher incidences of contact leading to higher levels of immigrant
preference. More specifically, Germany has taken action to ensure the participation of
immigrants in the labor market. The government has instituted programs designed to train
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immigrants to be successful in the workplace. They offer job and language training along with
internships to participants, greatly improving their chances to be successful economically (Joyce,
2018).

Other opportunities for contact outside the workplace can be expected to happen in places
in which people congregate, such as the theater and shopping trips, and general day to day life.
This meets the requirements Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) discuss in their reevaluation of
Allport’s theory. This is further exemplified by Jackman and Crane (1986), who find that the
frequent interactions regardless of the level of intimacy is effective at improving opinions of
outgroups. Therefore, I hypothesize (H2) that those respondents living in areas with larger
increases in immigrant populations will evaluate immigrants as being more beneficial to society.

Authoritarians pose a challenge to this logic, however. It is not in the authoritarian nature
to seek out new experiences, nor is it in their nature to open their minds to new experiences they
may happen upon. Instead, it is far more likely that authoritarians will actively try to avoid
interaction with outgroup members and will do their best to prevent the revaluation of their
preferences in the event they come across an outgroup member in their daily life (Pettigrew
2016, Hassen 1987, Oesterreich 2005). Therefore, contact theory will not have the opportunity to
provide the boost to improved evaluations for this group of people. Given this predisposition to
avoid new people and experiences, I propose hypothesis 2A: I predict that gains among the
general population, in their preferences towards immigrant populations, will be significantly
lower for those reporting submissive authoritarian attitudes.
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Data and Research Design
Data in this study come primarily from the nine rounds of the European Social Survey
(ESS) from 2002-2018. As my research question focuses on native attitudes towards immigrants
the data set has been restricted to include only German citizens. The resultant dataset consists of
16,541 observations over 9 waves of the survey. Using this data, I created two scales to test my
hypothesis. First, ranging from 0-30, the dependent variable combines several questions from the
survey to measure attitudes towards immigrants, with higher levels indicating greater preference
for immigrants. The scale is composed of three questions tapping citizen attitudes on the effect
immigrants have on the country. The first question asks the respondents opinion on immigrants
making the country a better place to live. The second asks if they believe that immigrants enrich
or undermine the country’s culture. And the last asks if immigrants are good or bad for the
economy. The alpha test was performed for this scale and is .8324.

Second, the main explanatory variable is a scale designed to capture submissive
authoritarian personality traits, higher scores indicating higher levels of authoritarianism. This
scale includes responses to three questions: the importance of behaving properly, the importance
of following the rules, and the importance of having a strong government. These traits were
combined to make a scale ranged from 0-3. Higher scores on this scale indicate higher levels of
submissive authoritarianism. The alpha for this scale is .6103.

Another key variable in this model is the change in immigrant population within each
Lander. The inclusion of this variable calls for the nesting of observations within Lander, which
requires the implementation of a hierarchical model. Because I expect there to be differences in
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the change of immigrant populations within Lander and over time, observations are nested within
Lander at the first level, with year being the second level of the model. The advantage to this
method is that it allows authoritarian attitudes in each of these levels (Lander and year) to vary.
This borrowing of variance from the second level (year) allows for more accurate estimation of
the first level (Lander) coefficients.

Threat and Attitude Activation
My expectation for this test of H1 is that larger changes of immigrants as a percentage of
the population in a Lander will lead to increasingly negative reported preferences towards
immigrants by authoritarians. Given authoritarians’ predilection for maintaining the cultural
status quo, I expect them to report negative preferences toward immigrants when immigrant
populations rise significantly, such as during the recent refugee crisis and during the wars
surrounding the breakup of Yugoslavia. However, small or negative changes to the immigrant
population should not have a significant effect on submissive authoritarians as they do not create
sufficient threat to activate authoritarian attitudes.

Table 1
Immigrant Preference
Authoritarianism
Immigrant Population
Change
Gender
Education
Age
Income
Unemployment
Ideology
Constant

Coefficient
-1.051

Standard
Error
0.099

5.869
-0.175
0.394
0.015
2.170
-1.150
-0.576
16.178

1.295
0.085
0.014
0.003
0.191
0.177
0.023
0.464
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95% Conf. Interval
-1.24571
-0.85668
3.330546
-0.34155
0.366507
0.010129
1.795745
-1.4982
-0.62142
15.26941

8.40727
-0.00934
0.421136
0.02036
2.54357
-0.80275
-0.52996
17.08662

Random-effects Parameters
Region: Independent
Authoritarianism
Constant
Year: Identity
Constant
Residual

Estimate

Standard
Error

1.134
0.868

0.223
0.296

0.772205
0.445187

1.666245
1.693135

0.826
5.379

0.080
0.030

0.683603
5.321377

0.998202
5.437789

95% Conf. Interval

Table 1 shows the results of the test of this hypothesis. Because higher values of the
dependent variable indicate a greater preference for immigrants and higher values of the main
explanatory variable indicate higher levels of authoritarianism, my expectation is of a negative
relationship between the two. In line with these expectations, the analysis shows a negative
relationship between authoritarianism an immigrant preference. However, this only confirms that
authoritarian attitudes have been activated, not that they are related to the change in immigrant
population. The main variable of interest in this test is the interaction of authoritarianism and the
change in immigrant population found in Table 2. While it has the appropriate sign, its
coefficient is not shown as significant, therefore more exploration of the results is required.

Table 2
Immigrant Preference
Authoritarianism
Immigrant Population
Change

Authoritarianism * Δ
immigrant population
Gender
Education
Age
Income
Unemployment
Ideology
Constant

Coefficient
-0.992

Standard
Error
0.108

9.568

2.961

3.765587

15.3713

-1.807
-0.176
0.394
0.015
2.164
-1.149
-0.575
16.049

1.303
0.085
0.014
0.003
0.191
0.177
0.023
0.476

-4.36049
-0.34169
0.367088
0.010142
1.789951
-1.4963
-0.62112
15.11628

0.74709
-0.00951
0.421741
0.020372
2.537924
-0.80088
-0.52967
16.98085
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95% Conf. Interval
-1.20378
-0.78119

Random-effects Parameters
Region: Independent
Authoritarian
Constant
Year: Identity
Constant
Residual

Estimate

Standard
Error

1.133
0.895

0.222
0.297

0.771303
0.467036

1.664966
1.714034

0.825
5.379

0.080
0.030

0.6823
5.321035

0.996699
5.43744

95% Conf. Interval

Figure 2 plots the interaction variable across the authoritarian spectrum at two of the
more extreme values of the immigrant population change variable. The 20% negative change in
immigration is a value which occurred in multiple Lander in 2004. This shift was precipitated by
the conclusion of the Yugoslavian wars and the desire of refugees to return home. The 20%
positive change is common during the mid-2010’s during the most recent immigration crisis (see
Figure 1 for reference). The y-intercept for each value is quite different given the power of
repeated interactions for the non-authoritarian portion of the sample. However, it is quite evident
authoritarian attitudes have a significant impact on preferences of immigrants for those
experiencing a large influx of immigrants. Such a large change in immigrant populations clearly
constitutes a threat to the status quo for authoritarians, contributing to their negative evaluations
of this outgroup.
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The attitudes towards immigrants in
areas with a large population decline
appear to be different. Here, despite the
lower overall score, the data indicate
there is very little difference in the way
authoritarians and non-authoritarians
view immigrants. Combined, this data
supports the hypothesis that large
increases in immigrant population constitute a significant threat to those respondents reporting
authoritarian personality traits leading to lower reported preferences for immigrants.
Contact theory plays a generous role in the appraisal of immigrants by native Germans.
The change in immigrant population is easily the most powerful variable in either model, thus
supporting my second hypothesis: those living in areas with larger increases in immigrant
populations will report higher preferences towards immigrants. The effect of increased
interaction with the immigrant groups is demonstrated by the y-intercepts of Figure 2. An almost
4-point gain for the least authoritarian respondents can be observed in the two samples. Even at
the mean of 2 for the authoritarianism variable, there appears to be a significant difference in the
expressed preferences for immigrants.

Further evidence of the power of intergroup contact is displayed below in Table 3. This
table reports results from a test of contact theory using the same model as seen above in Model 1
of Table 1. I have removed the authoritarian variable from this test, and as is shown, increases in
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immigrant population size led to significant changes in the reporting of preferences of
immigrants.

Table 3
Immigrant Preference
Immigrant Population
Change
Gender
Education
Age
Income
Unemployment
Ideology
Constant
Random-effects
Parameters
Region: Independent
Authoritarian
Constant
Year:
Constant
Residual

Coefficient

Standard Error

95% Conf. Interval

5.429
-0.150
0.407
0.012
2.190
-1.138
-0.592
14.975

1.283
0.085
0.014
0.003
0.191
0.177
0.023
0.471

Estimate

Standard Error

1.498
1.024

0.281
0.307

1.037577
0.568849

2.162308
1.843726

Identity
0.814
5.396

0.080
0.030

0.672088
5.337762

0.985976
5.454149

2.914701
-0.31608
0.380062
0.007264
1.816618
-1.48595
-0.63744
14.05277

7.943376
0.015937
0.434392
0.017441
2.563534
-0.79054
-0.54636
15.8977

95% Conf. Interval

Despite these gains related to contact theory, it appears those reporting at the highest
levels of authoritarianism are significantly less likely to be swayed in their opinions by increased
chances of interaction with the outgroup. Evidence indicates strong authoritarians, while there is
some discernable change, are far less likely to modify their appraisal of immigrants while the rest
of the population improves in their preferences for immigrants, a conclusion which is in line with
hypothesis 2A. It seems that while the rest of the population is able to alter their viewpoints
regarding outgroup members, authoritarians are unwilling to adapt to the changes brought on by
new members of the community, instead preferring the previous status quo.
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Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has examined the impact of large changes in immigrant populations on the
opinions of native populations. By investigating the role of authoritarian attitudes and large-scale
changes immigrant populations within the German setting, I was able to show evidence of two
simultaneous behaviors. First, those who report the highest levels of authoritarian attitudes are
most likely to express lower levels of preferences towards immigrants. Clearly, large changes in
the makeup of the population represents a significant threat to the status quo to those who fear its
change the most. Second, native interaction with members of the outgroup leads to improved
preferences towards that outgroup. Contact theory is clearly supported by findings. This holds
true even without the necessary conditions Allport (1954) put forth.

The significant population shifts the world has recently experienced has led to increased
interactions between cultures. People are being forced together by events beyond their control
with considerable implications to political processes in the host countries. The results of this
study show that the arrival of so many immigrants in a rather short time has triggered an
authoritarian response from a portion of the population. This has undoubtedly been a driver for
the success of so many of the right-wing nationalist parties in much of Europe. A main
consequence of the rise in influence of these parties has been the establishment of several antiimmigrant laws in not only Germany, but also many other European countries.

Instead of considering RWA as a unidimensional construct, this study focuses on the
traits associated with the subdimension of submissive authoritarianism. Considered the core of
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authoritarianism (Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner 1997), the study of submissive
authoritarianism focuses on the degree to which someone submits to authorities and is concerned
with those who represent a threat to the status quo. This is opposed, but still related to,
aggressive authoritarians who believe in a strong response to threats to the status quo and are
directly aggressive to them (Passini, 2017). Those scoring as high submissive authoritarians, but
lower in aggressive attitudes, are the not necessarily the ones who will join in anti-immigrant
protests or violence. Instead, they are the people who support the politicians who want to
implement illiberal policies directed towards the out-group. While they may not commit the
violence that makes the front page of the newspaper, they are the people silently supporting these
undemocratic policies.

Given that the data used in this survey exists at such a broad level of analysis, I cannot
hope to describe with any detail the level of interactions the respondents had with the immigrant
population. I can only say with certainty they lived in the same region and interacted with one
another in a manner proportional to the makeup of the population. Even so, without evidence of
the two people groups being forced to work together to achieve a certain goal, I find that
increased likelihood of interaction leads to improved levels of preferences. This finding holds
true for the entirety of the population. Of course, the level of change is non-constant, those who
score the lowest on the authoritarian scale make greater gains than those at the top. But across
the board, every level of authoritarianism improves their preference level when they encounter
large increases in the immigrant population. Figure 2 illustrates this result. Even at the extreme
right of the authoritarian scale improvement in preferences is visible.
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As Allport’s (1954) early work showed, it is important for people to have repeated
interaction with out-groups for their evaluations of those groups to be altered. The results in
Figure 2 are likely to influenced in two ways. First, the general size of the immigrant population
in each Lander impacts the opportunity for natives to interact with immigrants. Those areas with
higher concentrations of immigrates are the most likely to foster these interactions which foster
improved evaluations. Therefore, it is likely, that in areas with high immigrant populations
interaction with immigrants is inevitable. This encourages an increase in positive changes in
immigrant evaluation through the native population.

Second, individuals still have agency. I have argued that those reporting authoritarian
attitudes are least likely to seek out the opportunities that would help improve evaluations. Even
in areas with large immigrant populations, those with high authoritarian scores have the ability to
diminish interaction as much as possible. This, among other things, may help explain why I find
such a small shift in immigrant evaluation by high authoritarians.

The implication of this result is that there is still hope for improved relations between
immigrants and their harshest critics. Despite the negative influence of authoritarian attitudes, it
seems exposure does positively impact the evaluation of immigrants across the range of
authoritarianism. The message is clear for those in power who want to improve relations between
people groups. Increasing the opportunities for group interaction will lead to improved
intergroup relations. However, this is probably easier said than done. As I noted previously,
those who report the highest levels of authoritarianism are those who are also the least likely to
seek out, or be open to, opportunities to interact with members of the outgroup. It will be
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incumbent, therefore, upon community leaders to seek out those members of the communities
and encourage their peaceful interaction with the new members of the society.
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CHAPTER 2

FAST FOOD AND FRENCH CULTURE:
GLOBALIZATION AND SUPPORT FOR
NATIONALIST PARTIES
Introduction
The rise of right-wing populist movements in the United States and Europe can be traced
to a multitude of sources. Many studies focus on the role immigration and racial attitudes have
played in this right-ward shift. In these studies, it is reported that it is not those who are in direct
daily contact with outgroup members that report negative preferences towards outgroup
members, but those who are less likely to encounter outgroup members who exhibit antioutgroup sentiments (Svelkoul, M et al., 2011; Kim, 2019). However, it is not only the influx of
people that can impact a population’s political preferences, the arrival of foreign corporate
entities my also influence political preferences. This paper explores the relationship between
support for radical right-wing political parties and level of local globalization. Using the
presence of an American fast-food company as a proxy for the level of globalization in French
electoral districts, I measure the relationship between globalization and the electoral support of
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right-wing nationalist parties. Results indicate a negative relationship between globalization and
radical right-wing support. Increases in the level of globalization predict lower support for
nationalistic political parties, even when controlling for other predictors for right-wing support
such as immigration and unemployment.

Multinational food corporations have been expanding their influence globally for
decades. When these food MNC’s decide to branch out into new countries they are not just
bringing their name with them, but also the American fast-food culture. Often these companies
will adopt portions of the local food culture in an effort to endear themselves to the local
populations, but the formula of high efficiency-large volume sales developed by these companies
remains. In some instances, these companies are welcomed with open arms. Many of us can
recall the images of the hours long lines at the first McDonald’s to open in Russia after the fall of
communism. However, this is not always the case. Negative reactions to the appearance of the
symbols of globalization are also a possible outcome. For example, the first Starbucks to open in
the Forbidden City was met with open hostility from the local population (Han, H. K. & Zhang,
A., 2009) citing threats to the Chinese culture.

This paper focuses on the impact globalization has had on French food culture, its
national identity, and the role globalization has played in its evolution. As described by Reicher
and Hopkins (2001), national identity is comprised of history, emblems, cultural icons, and the
physical environment. For the French people, food, and its preparation, is an important part of
their national identity. The French response to the potential threat fast food MNC’s pose to their
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national identity has been quite vigorous. The people and the government have taken significant
symbolic and concrete steps to preserve their food culture in the face of this relatively new
threat. For example, France has petitioned UNESCO to add the French baguette to the List of
Intangible Cultural Heritage. The head of the Confederation of French Bakery and Pastry,
Doninique Anract, is quoted in an argument for the inclusion of the baguette on the List, “Bread
is the image of France… stop going to buy bread in supermarkets… [buying from local
producers] favors the artisan bread maker” (Pinay-Rabaroust, 2018). This statement not only
indicates the importance of the baguette as a symbol of the national identity of France, but also
highlights the importance of the process through which it is made. Anract goes on to lament the
role of foreign producers of the bread sold in supermarkets and the potential impact this has on
the production of bread within France. He argues that foreign producers are driving local bread
makers out of business, which will lead to the loss of the traditions related to the local production
of the baguette.

This anecdote is important as it illustrates two main ideas. First, that food is an intrinsic
part of the national identity of France. Anract’s declaration of the baguette as important to the
French identity clearly places the role of food as an extremely important part of the cultural make
up of French culture. Second, this argument focuses not only on the food, but the manner in
which it is prepared as being a part of the French identity. Not only does Anract lament the loss
of the integrity of the bread, he also is dismayed that the bread is not produced by French bread
makers, but by a Romanian company. He is expressing the threat he feels of the loss of culture
surrounding the production of this French staple. Instead of artisan bread makers producing the
baguettes and passing their knowledge down to their apprentices, foreign producers, with a
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competitive advantage, are taking over the market and driving the bread making industry out of
France.

Similar thinking surrounds the arrival of fast-food chains, which first arrived in Paris
in1972, via McDonald’s. Fast food, or malbouffe, flies in the face of the tradition of French
cuisine and the industry which surrounds it. Fast food is threatening to replace the traditions and
customs which were built and maintained over centuries, passed down from generation to
generation. Instead of passing by restaurants that are locally owned and run by people they
know, French people are driving down streets and finding new establishments with foreign
names like McDonald’s, Burger King, KFC and Starbucks. These new names represent a threat
to their culture and national identity.

The relationship between Burger King and France provides an interesting opportunity to
study the role of globalization and support for right-wing nationalist political parties (RRWPs).
Burger King initially attempted to break into the French market in the 1990’s but was unable to
turn a profit. However, in 2013, Burger King made a second attempt at the French market and
has become fairly successful. This return to France is fortuitous for this study as it occurred just
after the 2012 French presidential elections, and just before the immigration crisis hit Europe in
2014-15. This coincidence provides a reference point for analysis of the impact of Burger King,
and globalization in general, on electoral support of RRWPs.
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France is not only interesting due to the presence of its food culture and Burger King. It is
also of interest due to its recent history of RRWPs. In the early 1970’s, France played host to the
rebirth of nationalism and right-wing extremism in Europe when Jean-Marie Le Pen established
the National Front (FN), now named the National Rally (Berenzin, 2009). The FN received little
electoral support until a shift in electoral rules2 allowed them to gain 35 seats in the National
Assembly. They used their newly found political legitimacy to propose legislation focused on
limiting access to citizenship and employment for foreigners (Fabre, 2002). Following a return to
a majoritarian system, the FN was reduced to one or no representatives in the following elections
until 2012 and 2017 in which they won two and eight seats, respectively.

Since 1974, the FN has put forth candidates for President seven times, two of which
succeeded in reaching the second round; first in 2002 with Jean-Marie and in 2017, with Marine,
his daughter. The ascension of Marine to the leadership of the National Front led to a softening
of the extremist views of the party. She backed the party away from some of her father’s more
extreme viewpoints, such as the questioning of the existence of gas chambers during the
Holocaust. While both of her presidential runs maintained an anti-immigrant platform, there was
an increased emphasis on anti-globalization. Le Pen focused on the role globalization played in
the high unemployment rate and the loss of French culture. In both campaigns she advocated
strongly for protectionist policies for French products and for a return to a national currency
(Schofield, 2012).

2

In the 1986 national elections, France shifted from a winner-take-all system to a proportional representation
system.
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The arrival of the National Front heralded the beginning of a new political trend in
Europe. Through a variety of processes, RRWPs have cropped up in most European nations with
varying levels of success. In some cases, such as Poland and Austria, they have been able to rise
to government status, the results of which have been drastically illiberal (Wasik, Z. & Foy, H.,
2016). The populist Law and Order party in Poland, in addition to other illiberal policies, has
used its power to pack the courts and control the national news organizations. The rise of
RRWPs in Austria has encourage the implementation of various anti-immigrant laws and the
construction of fences on their borders with other EU members.

In Germany, in 2017, the Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) became the first nationalist
political party to enter the Bundestag since WWII. The Lega Nord, which began as a regional
nationalist movement in northern Italy, has become one of the most vocal anti-globalization
parties within Europe, arguing globalization is ruining the culture of European civilizations
(Zaslove, 2008).

In this paper, I examine the relationship between globalization and shift in popular
support of the radical right-wing parties between first rounds of the 2012 and 2017 French
Presidential elections. The 2017 election represents the most success the FN has had in
presidential elections since its inception. The combination of the immigrant crises, incidents of
terrorism, high unemployment and anti-globalization preferences led to Marine Le Pen’s surprise
first round success. Controlling for the impact of immigration and the economy, I study the
relationship between globalization, using Burger King Restaurants as a proxy, and the electoral
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support of right-wing parties in France. I also interact the influence of globalization with
variables measuring immigration and the economy to determine whether globalization is
working in conjunction with these phenomena or if it stands alone as a predictor to RWP
support.

This paper will proceed as follows. First, I will discuss the role of food and food service
in the context of the French national identity. I will then discuss the impact of identity and
cultural threat on the likelihood of supporting a RWP candidate for president. I will then review
the dataset developed to test my hypotheses regarding the impact of globalization on French
support for right-wing nationalist parties. I will close with a discussion of the results and their
implications for globalization and political actors.

French National Identity and Food
French culture is currently being transformed by two distinct forces of globalization. On
one hand, we have the influence of new cultures via the large influx of immigrants due to the
recent immigration crisis and the expansion of the EU. Combined with the softened borders
within the Schengen area and the expansion of the EU’s membership, each new wave of
countries admitted to the EU brought new opportunities for people to immigrate in search of new
opportunities (Akaliyski, 2019). These migrants not only brought with them the desire for
improved lives, but also their cultures. The influx of these new cultures in the more prosperous
Western European states created some sense of anxiety within certain portions of the populations
due to the potential erosion of the national culture (Alkopher, T. D. & Blanc, E., 2017). On the
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other hand, we have globalization and the homogenization of culture brought on by the
expansion of world markets and the political integration of the European continent. It is this
latter influence which this paper will explore.

The expansion of capitalistic economic strategies in the last three decades has had a
dramatic impact on the influence of MNC’s throughout Europe (Castles, 2011). As these MNC’s
fight for control of markets and to expand their consumer base, they bring with them the
potential to influence local cultures (Holton, 2000). There has been significant discussion of the
homogenization of culture due to the influence of MNC’S, especially those based in America. As
American brands have attempted to branch out into foreign markets, there has been significant
push back against the McDonaldization of culture. Other brands such as Coca-Cola, Wal-Mart
and Disney have received similar criticism for their role in the homogenization of culture around
the world (Gordon & Meunier, 2001; Meyer, J. P., 2008). However, it is unlikely that these
MNC’s have the potential to create cultural change on the global scale for which they are
credited. Yes, they do have the potential to alter culture, but there are too many other influences
acting upon culture to allow these MNC’s to create the drastic changes some fear.

There are too many other factors that go into the maintenance of culture to allow for
complete homogenization. As large and influential as corporations like McDonald’s and Burger
King are, they do not have the ability to completely change food culture. Consider the dietary
restrictions of the Hindu culture concerning beef. You will not find a beef Whopper on the
Indian Burger King menu. Instead, you will find a menu full of chicken and vegetarian options.

47

French culture too, has found its way onto the Burger King menu. While the Burger King France
menu looks very similar to an American menu, the desserts on offer there are of a greater variety
than those of their American counterparts. The impact in the French context is the manner in
which food is presented and consumed. This Americanization of food changes its presentation,
content, and dining experience. These examples lend themselves to the idea that instead of
homogenizing culture, MNC’s instead are hybridizing culture (Holton, 2000). They are taking
parts of the local culture, combining them with their own cultural identity and packaging it all up
to sell in that market.

The French response to globalization has been one of resistance. Known for centuries as
one of the cultural leaders and trend setters of the world, France has fought to keep its cultural
identity intact from the influence of MNC’s and foreign institutions such as Hollywood. And
while France is still widely known for its cultural influences in fashion and film, it is arguably
most well-known for its cuisine. The importance of food to the national identity is hard to be
overstated, and consequently threats to this portion of the country’s culture are taken quite
seriously. Fast food is an especially egregious challenge to France’s food culture as it flies in the
face of their culinary traditions (Gordon and Meunier, 2001).

The French people and their government have fought a long battle against the influence
of MNC’s, especially American companies, on French culture. Beginning with fights for the
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protection of the French movie industry, the “Coca-Cola affair3” (Kuo, 2017), and the vilification
of Disney (Meyer, 2008), the French have consistently fought perceived threats to their national
identity. The intensity and consistency of these efforts is a testimony to the French people’s
attachment to that identity, and evidence to the threat they experience when they perceive that
identity to be under attack.

The most recent national elections in France in 2017 featured globalization as one of the
key issues, with Macron supporting and Le Pen speaking out in defiance (Meunier, 2017). While
the focus of the globalization debate in this election was generally concerning the impact of
immigration, globalization and the concept of food as part of the national French identity was
strongly in place. One regional slogan ‘Non au Kebbab, oui a la socca’ (no to Kebbab, yes to
socca) was a direct attack on the large number of Kebbab shops which have opened in the city of
Nice. These shops pose a threat to local socca producers, an integral party of the identity of that
region. A pancake made of chickpea flour and olive oil, socca is ingrained into the culture of
Cote d’Azur, some tracing its roots to the times of the Roman occupation. While we should not
ignore the obvious racist undertones of this slogan, this example shows the importance of food
culture to the identity of the French people (Binet, 2016).

The sharing of a national identity connects the members of the group to one
another via shared values, norms, and traditions, and food and food service are an intrinsic part

3

In the late 1940’s Coca-Cola attempted to enter the French market. Communists and wine growers fought back
against this expansion, seeing it as the beginning of American economic imperialism.
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of the fabric that makes up the French national identity (Porcini, 2017). From the dishes prepared
and the ingredients used, to the shared history around its creation, cuisine is inherently a part of
the French culture. I argue that globalization presents a clear threat to the French national
identity via its erosion of the tradition surrounding food and food service.

Globalization and Cultural Threat
Globalization has affected the world in a variety of ways. Politically the world is
becoming increasingly integrated. The rise of international organizations such as the EU, UN,
and NAFTA have encroached on state sovereignty, resulting in significant pushback among
certain domestic audiences. Immigration has had a tremendous impact on domestic policy
making and voter preferences. Economically we are tied together more than ever before. Put
simply, globalization is the process of compacting the worlds cultures and economies and
increasing their interactions among its people (Robertson, 1992). The result of so much increased
trade, travel and communication in recent years is that people are more frequently exposed to
different cultures, ideas, and people than ever before. These increased levels of globalization
imply that it has become more likely that people will be exposed to representations of their own
culture and foreign cultures simultaneously. There are two possible outcomes to this experience.
One, people will find this an enriching experience, in which they are able to broaden their
horizons and open themselves to new ideas and experiences. Or two, they can withdraw and
make a concerted attempt to resist the encroachment of the world on their way of life (Chiu et al.,
2011).
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In this study, Burger King stands in as a representation for the level of globalization an
area has experienced. One of the main reasons Burger King was chosen for this study, is that it
has not come close to reaching the level popularity of McDonald’s in France. Burger King has
about 250 different locations in France, while McDonald’s has over 1,300. McDonald’s has been
around in France since the late 1970’s and has maintained that presence ever since. Their arrival
certainly created a certain amount of fear over cultural homogenization and was met with quite a
bit of hostility from those who viewed them as a threat to France’s food culture. However, their
long tenure and vast presence within the country makes them representative of an earlier wave of
globalization.

The reemergence of Burger King, however, represents a new wave. They were present in
France in the 1990’s but were unable to make a profit and closed their stores. In 2013, Burger
King returned with a mindset to become major players in the food industry and have developed a
strong presence. Also in this wave were Chipotle, opening in 2012, Subway in 2001, Five Guys
in 2016, and KFC, who has recently made a new investment push in attempt to capture more of
the market. I chose Burger King for this study due to the proximity of its arrival to the 2012
election and its strong effort to capture a large portion of the market quickly. The other options
for study either arrived too early, too late, or only appeared weakly in the market. For example,
Chipotle is only located in Paris and Five Guys only appeared just prior to the 2017 elections.
Burger King, on the other hand, came into the market rapidly and covered a large geographic
area, with at least one store in every department. This expansion of American fast-food chains in
France, for some, has the potential to create an environment in which the French people feel a
certain level of anxiety over the threat these restaurants pose to French culture.
51

Negative reactions to foreign cultures, in this case American fast food, are brought on by
the perception that the presence of a foreign company is in some way a threat to the continuation
of the local culture. The arrival of Burger King and other fast food MNC’s can trigger defensive
cognitive reactions in the local population if they see these icons of a foreign culture co-existing
within their own cultural spaces (Chen and Chui, 2010). This visual interaction primes their
minds to perceive competition between the two cultures, resulting in negative attitudes for the
foreign cultural entity (Torelli and Cheng, 2011).

The threat of loss of culture is a main driver for a plethora of negative reactions in
various societies. In fact, a major impetus of terrorist violence is the perceived subjugation of the
terrorist’s culture to that of foreign cultures (Kruglanski et al., 2009). In 1999, José Bové, a
French producer of Roquefort cheese, attacked and destroyed a McDonald’s which was under
construction in Millau, France. He claimed his motivation was twofold: tariffs placed on, among
other goods, Roquefort cheese by the American government, and the use of American hormone
treated beef in the McDonald’s restaurants (Daley, 2000).

Mr. Bové’s attack on such a well-recognized symbol of America and globalization is an
example of the importance of culture to a person’s identity. He was attacking two perceived
threats to that identity, the economic impact of the tariffs on the culturally significant food he
produced and the use of foreign sourced beef in foreign owned restaurants. Globalization has
created an environment in which traditional national cultures have become threatened and
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contaminated by other cultures (Craig & Douglas, 2006) which has led to push back from those
who view their cultural identity as under attack.

Why is national identity so important to Bové and people like him? Why does it matter
that foreign firms are spreading around the globe and bringing their home cultures with them? I
argue it is due to our instinctual need to belong to a social group, in this case a national identity.
Belonging to social groups has been important for human survival for millennia. Belonging to a
social group provides a frame of reference for what is from the in-group and safe and what is
form the out-group and is a potential threat (Theiss-Moore, 2009).

Brewer (1993) argues that the larger an in-group becomes and the more depersonalized
its customs become, the more its ideology becomes moral authority. Once a social group has
developed its norms into a moral authority, it becomes relatively easy to view its morals as
superior to the morals of other groups. One of the French’s largest objections to the American
fast-food industry is its lack of artistry. The methods of French food making have been passed
down from master to apprentice and have been developed into an art. Fast food, on the other
hand, can be cooked and assembled by a teenager following one afternoon of training. Why
would French restaurateurs and food merchants not feel threatened by the fast-food industry? A
Whopper from Burger King surely offers strong competition to socca. In a world that is
becoming increasingly fast paced and cost conscious, the Whopper is an attractive option to
those looking for a quick meal. This perceived shift in societal preferences poses a threat to those
who view food and food service as part of their national identity.

53

MNC’s are attuned to the conditions of the markets they are considering for expansion.
Prior to investment, they perform significant research into economic and social aspects of the
area in an effort to gauge the potential for success. It is my hypothesis that fast-food MNC’s are
aware of the increase in anxiety brought on by the threat to the national identity their arrival can
cause, and will therefore, seek out locations that are more tolerant of the presence of foreign
cultures. I predict restaurants will be less likely to be placed in those areas which electorally
support candidates who speak out against the impacts of globalization. The FN and the Le Pens
have been vocal opponents to the processes of globalization and their deleterious impacts on
French culture, focusing on food culture quite often. Hypothesis 1 predicts that those areas in
which Burger King has opened a new store will be less likely to electorally support the RRWPs.

Hypothesis 1: Those electoral districts with Burger King restaurants present will present
lower levels of electoral support for RWP than areas without.

Up to this point I have considered globalization acting alone as a predictor for RWP support.
However, it may be that globalization is working in conjunction with other forces of RWP
support, such as immigration or economic conditions. Both of these forces have been shown to
influence voter support of RRWPs (Jackman, R. W. & Volpert, K., 1996).

The FN slogan of “Keep France for the French,” is an obvious indicator of their nativist
preferences, and a signal to those who are threatened by the presence of immigrants. This threat
can manifest in a variety of ways. Symbolic threat, as I have discussed previously in this paper,
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absolutely applies to assessments of immigrants. Hostility produced by symbolic threat is rooted
in the idea that the out-group in some way violates traditionally shared values of the in-group
(Kinder & Sears, 1981). Symbolic threat from groups that are highly dissimilar from one’s own
can lead to negative evaluations towards these groups. Reactions to symbolic threat in the time
period in question are exemplified by laws against head coverings in public places and
moratoriums of minaret construction.

Changes in the power dynamics between groups can create an elevated level of anxiety in
the dominant group (Tajfel, 1982; Stephan & Stephan, 2013), known as realistic threat. This is
the exact situation faced in France following the immigration crisis in 2015. Realistic threat
theory postulates that large influxes of immigrant populations create concerns within native
populations that they would now be in competition with immigrants for scarce resources such as
jobs and welfare (Quillian, 1995). Supporters of the FN and likeminded parties cast their votes
for them with the expectation that they will follow through with their nationalistic platform
promises, such as limiting the political and social rights of non-citizens (Della Posta, 2013).

Given the sudden rise in immigration and the expansion of globalization I theorize that
the relationship between the two forces would be multiplicative. The people of France are
witnessing an increased level of foreign cultures impacting their environment in two ways. New
people are coming to their country to live and new corporations from foreign lands are buying up
property and erecting symbols of those foreign countries. The combination of these two forces is
likely to cause a certain level of anxiety within the population. However, given the role that
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repeated interaction plays in the assessment of out-groups (Allport, 1950; Pettigrew, 1998), only
those who do not have a consistent level of interactions with immigrants should be negatively
affected by their presence in the country. Therefore, I hypothesize support for RRWPs should
increase in those communes without a Burger King and with lower levels of immigration.

-

Hypothesis 2: Those electoral districts without Burger King restaurants and low levels of
immigration will present higher levels of electoral support for RRWPs.

Another potential driver for support for RRWPs is the condition of the economy,
specifically unemployment (Jackson & Volpert, 1996; Golder 2003). Globalization does not just
affect the culture of an area; it also has the potential to impact the labor market. As the global
market becomes more intertwined and jobs shift from import competing sectors of the economy,
perceptions of the process of globalization shift as well. This can lead to a negative evaluation of
the process of globalization despite all of the benefits we receive from it as a society (Kletzer,
2005). RRWPs have an opportunity surrounding economic policy that most parties do not have.
Generally, RRWPs shy away from taking a strong stance on economic issues, instead focusing
on cultural issues, such as immigration (Rydgren, 2005). This historical ambivalence allows
RRWPs to tailor economic strategies relevant to the economic environment surrounding the
current election.

While unemployment is used in this study as an indicator of the economic situation in an
area, the impact of globalization on Western economies reaches much further than mere job loss.
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Those areas most impacted by import competition also face reduced earnings (Acemoglu et al.
2016) and poorer physical and mental health (Colantone & Stanig, 2018). Due to the economic
concerns contemporary to the most recent French elections, RRWPs became attractive to those
who see globalization as a threat to the economy and their jobs could turn to as they promised a
return to the old structures that allowed jobs to be plentiful and wages to be high (Umbrass,
2017). This is accomplished by these RRWPs via several strategies, a common one being the
development of platforms in which they offer support for welfare chauvinism (Achterberg et al.,
2011). Marine Le Pen has been a vocal advocate for this strategy, tying it into immigration fears,
by arguing for reserving employment, housing, and welfare for French citizens (Schumacer &
van Kersbergen, 2016).

This economic strategy is clearly aimed at potential voters who are considered losers to
the process of economic globalization. Welfare chauvinism, as promoted by Le Pen, targets the
working class who face the most economic threat from globalization. By shifting towards a more
socialist economic policy position the FN can attract new voters who may not be located as far
right culturally, but fear the loss of jobs to foreign producers (Ivaldi, 2015). Given the FN’s shift
towards a more well-defined economic strategy targeted towards globalization losers, I
hypothesize there will be a positive interactive effect between globalization and unemployment.

-

Hypothesis 3: Those electoral districts without Burger King restaurants and high levels of
unemployment will present higher levels of electoral support for RRWPs.
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Data and Results
The data used to explore these hypotheses is multi-level, with the lowest level existing at
the commune level. While individual level data would be somewhat more effective in exploring
the hypotheses put forth, data at this level will help determine the overall mood of the electorate
as it relates to globalization. Using data at the commune level instead of the individual level
allows for equal representation across all groupings as issues such as variation in the number of
responses between departments are avoided. The data from this study come predominantly from
the French Ministry of the Interior through publicly available sources. Ministry data includes
election, population, and employment data. Additionally, I developed the restaurant portion of
the data set by pulling location data from the Burger King France website.

The dependent variable for all tests of the hypotheses is share of the vote for right-wing
national parties in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections. This variable includes the
votes for four parties, the FN, Debout la France, Resistons!, and the Popular Republican Union.
The FN, as previously discussed, ran Marine Le Pen as their presidential candidate. Debout la
France, headed by Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, is a small party with one seat in the national
assembly, whose main focus is French Nationalism and the impacts of European integration.
Dupont-Aignan ran in both 2012 and 2017, receiving very few votes. In 2017 he endorsed Le
Pen in the second round of presidential voting. Neither of the other two parties hold seats in any
legislative body.
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Geographically, mainland France is divided into 13 political regions. This study does not
consider those areas outside the continent. Further each of those 13 regions are divided into
departments, which are divided into communes. The main explanatory variable for the testing of
the hypotheses is at the commune level. Both the actual number of restaurants and a dichotomous
variable were tested for both hypotheses and the results were unaffected. Reports for hypothesis
1 are shown with the dichotomous variable in which 1 equals the presence of a Burger King
restaurant. All results are reported with the four major cities of Paris, Marseille, Lyon, and
Toulouse included. The results are unaffected in tests run with the omission of these cities, with
only minor changes to the size of the coefficients.

I control for three different variables in each test. First, I control for previous voting
patterns by including the RWP voting percentage of the commune in the 2012 elections. Second,
as immigration is a major part of RRWPs’ platforms, I have included the percentage of
immigrants in each commune for the year 2016. This is the most time relevant data made
available via the Ministry of the Interior. Finally, I control for unemployment as a percentage of
the population as this is the most reliable economic indicator for voting for RRWPs (Jackman
and Volpert, 1996).

This study employs a multilevel model as data is aggregated at two different levels. First
restaurant, electoral, immigration, and population data are all at the commune level. This first
level is nested within the second level, the department level, which includes the unemployment
data. The resultant data set includes an N of 34,472 with 93 distinct groups.
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It does need to be stated that in no way does this study assume the selection of restaurant
location to be exogenous to voter attitudes. These rather wealthy MNC’s are fully capable of
researching potential restaurant sites prior to their expansion. It is reasonable to assume some
overlap in the traits of less-than-ideal customers and RRWP supporters. Also, the main goal for
these MNC’s is to maximize profit, not promote any sort of cultural change. Location selection is
likely to be influenced by factors such as local economic factors, presence of other similar
MNC’s, and internal coordination costs (Sami, M. & Eldomiaty, T. I., 2020).

Results for the test of the first hypothesis, those electoral districts with Burger King
restaurants present will present lower levels of electoral support for RWP than areas without, are
shown below on Table 1. The results do support the hypothesis. We can see the main explanatory
variable is significant at the .01 level, however the sign in the correct direction of the theorized
expectation indicating those communities with Burger King restaurants are less likely to support
an RWP.

The coefficient for the main explanatory variable is fairly weak in comparison to the
control variables. Unsurprisingly, the strongest predictor for votes supporting RRWPs in 2017
was the electoral support from the previous election in 2012. The economic variable was also
fairly strong and in the expected direction. The immigration variable was the weakest of the three
control variables and was in line with the main explanatory variable.
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Both the presence of a Burger King and the presence of an immigrant population lead to a
decrease in the vote share enjoyed by RRWPs. Clearly, the percentage of immigrants is a
stronger indicator of electoral support for a department, but to what extent. The value of a one
unit change in the number of Burger Kings for a department is equivalent to an increase in the
immigrant percentage in a department of .164%. While immigrant percentage is the stronger
indicator for RRWP support, both are statistically and substantively important to the dependent
variable.
Table 1
Votes Supporting the Right - 2017

Burger King
Votes Supporting the Right - 2012
Immigrant level
Unemployment level
Constant

N

-0.024
(0.004)***
0.892
(0.005)***
-0.146
(0.008)***
0.479
(0.179)**
0.08
(0.017)***
34,472

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 2 reports the results of the tests of hypotheses 2 and 3. These hypotheses
considered the interactive role of the presence of Burger King and immigration, and Burger King
and unemployment. In both models the Burger King variable takes the value of 1 if there is not a
restaurant present in the commune. In both tests of the interactive effect of globalization, the
interacted variable was insignificant, indicating there is no interactive relationship between
globalization and common drivers of RWP support. The implications of this finding will be
discussed in the next section of the paper.
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Table 2
Votes
Supporting the
Right - 2017

Immigration

Burger King

Unemployment

-0.024
(0.008)**
-0.146
(0.008)***
0.005
(0.063)

Immigrant Population
BK * Immigrant %
BK * Unemployment
%

-0.013
(0.028)
-0.146
(0.008)***

-0.117

2012 RRWP Vote %

0.892
(0.005)***
0.479
(0.179)***
0.086
(0.017)***
34,472

Unemployment
Constant
N

(0.289)
0.892
(0.005)***
0.480
(0.179)***
0.086
(0.017)***
34,472

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
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Figures 1 and 2 further exemplify the lack of an interactive relationship between the
globalization variable and immigration (Figure 1) and globalization and unemployment (Figure
2). At no point in either figure is the interaction close to relevance, implying that globalization is
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an independent indicator of support for RRWPs. I will discuss these results and their
implications in the next section.

Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has explored the relationship between globalization and the support for rightwing nationalist parties. Using Burger King restaurants as a proxy for the level of globalization a
community has experienced, I developed tests to examine this relationship. Tests indicate that
those communities with lower levels of globalization are more likely to be supportive of RRWPs
than those with higher levels of globalization. Based on the information available in extant
literature and the results reported here, it seems that those who live in areas giving them
increased exposure to symbols of globalization are less likely to support RRWPs. These results
do not indicate a causal relationship between the arrival MNCs and electoral support of RRWPs,
only the indicative nature of the relationship between the two.

Culture is an ever-changing aspect of our societies. Influences such as foreign restaurants,
members of other cultures, and the media are constantly bringing new ideas and customs into our
communities. Some of these ideas become adopted into our cultures and some are left to fall to
the wayside. The people who are less threatened by these changes are likely those who have
more consistent exposure to new ideas and symbols. Contact with, and exposure to, other
cultures is extremely important to the development of positive attitudes towards them (Allport,
1954; Pettigrew, 2016). These are people who live in more urban areas. Due to their comfort
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with a globalized world, the people here are less likely to buy into messages from groups like the
FN who tout the threat globalization has on the French national identity.

Those living in more rural areas where globalization has not had as much of an impact
are less likely to be confronted with images of globalization as frequently as their urban
counterparts. Due to this limited exposure to globalization, when they are faced with
representations of different cultures in their country, they are more likely to experience cultural
threat. The lack of forced exposure to the images of globalization allows this group of people to
choose their level of exposure to them (Pettigrew, 2016). They are not compelled to daily walk
down the street and see all the evidence of globalization in juxtaposition to the symbols of their
national identity. They can choose how often they want to travel to the closest Burger King for a
meal. If they are threatened by these symbols of globalization, they have the ability to remain in
their hometowns, insulate themselves from the world, and vote for political candidates who
support the limiting of globalization.

In addition to these findings, the results also indicate that globalization is a predictor of
RRWP support. It operates independently from other known RWP influences such as
immigration and economic factors. While these other influencing variables are stronger and more
predictive of RWP support on their own, globalization clearly still plays a role in the decisionmaking calculus of French voters. This is significant because it shows voter response to
messages from RRWPs that are supportive of protectionist policies. These protectionist policy
preferences, spurred by the recent economic and immigration crisis, threaten France’s
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participation in international organizations such as the EU and Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership. Limiting participation in organizations like these has the potential to
prevent France from prospering from future investment and international trade opportunities. The
consequences of pursing such protectionist policies could exacerbate current economic hardships
faced by those already suffering due to job/wage loss brought on by globalization.

The results also provide information to two groups, MNC’s and politicians. MNC’s can
take away from this study the importance of national identity in those areas where globalization
has least touched. They may be able to make inroads into these communities if they are able to
show they are less of a threat to the national identity. By embracing the local culture and
adopting its symbols, these companies may be able to reduce the perceived threat they pose to
national identities. However, this may be unlikely. As these companies are motivated by
increasing their profits, engineering acceptance of foreign brands in small markets is not likely a
part of their agenda. Companies like Coca-Cola, McDonalds, and Burger King are well aware of
the welcome their industries have received in the past and have likely learned their lesson. They
will seek out potential locations with local acceptance in mind, shying away from those places
they feel will not support their products.

Politicians seeking election in these less globalized areas should consider the amount of
support they display towards agents of cultural change such as these MNC’s. The results of this
study indicate people in less globalized areas cast votes in support of parties whose platforms
include the minimization of the effects of globalization. Showing support for this process in
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these areas least touched by globalization is likely to cost the candidate at the ballot box. Instead,
it would be wise for pro-globalization candidates in these areas to focus on other topics that are
germane to the region.

Future research into the effects of globalization should include more individual level
attempts at measuring its effects. While the opportunity provided by Burger King and the French
presidential elections has provided a good window in the impact globalization has had on the
French electorate, it would be helpful to better understand individual level motivations for
supporting anti-globalization political candidates. The more we understand about why people
support nationalistic right-wing groups, the better we are able to counter illiberal influences and
ensure democratic rights for all members of democratic regimes, not just those in the dominant
group.
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CHAPTER 3
ILLIBERAL INFLUENCE: THE EFFECT OF RADICAL RIGHTWING PARTIES ON CENTRIST PARTIES’ POSITIONS
Introduction
The rebirth of right-wing extremism in Europe occurred in France in the late 1970s with
the foundation of the National Front (Berezin, 2009). Since then, right-wing extremism has
slowly grown into an international movement, gaining strength and influence throughout the
continent. Recent regional events, coupled with long term trends, have created an environment in
which extremism has been able to thrive. Radical right-wing parties (RRWPs) have been able to
use divisive rhetoric to improve their electoral success, in turn taking influence and support from
mainstream parties. These electoral gains, such as the success of the AfD in Germany, have led
to very real threats to established international organizations like the EU, and to the freedoms of
those living in countries in which these parties have influence.

A recent report by Freedom House (2019) highlights the deleterious impact RRWPs have
had on the global level of freedom. In the last 13 years, Europe in particular has experienced a
decrease in all categories Freedom House uses to measure freedom, with functioning of
government, freedom of expression, and rule of law being the categories with the greatest losses.
A clear example of the threat RRWPs pose to liberal institutions has taken place in Poland. The
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Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS), following electoral success which placed them in control of
the government, replaced judges seen as hostile to the new as an effort to fix Polish society
(Wasik, Z. & Foy, H., 2016). This allowed the new government to make drastic changes to
media organizations, including ownership, content, and distribution.

The Hungarian government has also taken steps to limit liberal institutions and their
influence within its borders. The government has withdrawn accreditation from gender studies
programs, taxed programs for migrants and refugees, and expelled the Central European
University from Budapest (CEU). The CEU, backed by George Soros, the United States, and the
European Union, was initially designed to help the European academic community transition
from communism following its fall in the early 1990’s (Redden, 2018). The expulsion of the
university from Hungary, along with the incursions on academic freedom, clearly indicates a
regime hostile to liberal influences.

The influence of illiberalism in Europe is exemplified by the closing of the CEU in
Hungary and the overhaul of the justice system in Poland. These are just two examples of the
ways in which these RRWPs are changing the political landscape in Europe when they have
government status. What impact do they have when they are not in government? Are they still
able to wield influence and alter the behaviors of governing parties?

There are several examples of their ability to impact policy without being in government,
Brexit being the most obvious. UKIP, though never gaining more than two seats in the House of
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Commons (they did, however, win a majority of the British seats in the EU parliament), was able
to force the Conservative Party to run on a promise of a referendum on the UK’s membership in
the EU (Evans, G., & Mellon, J., 2019). However, in many European countries the changes
brought on by these RRWPs are much more subtle. Following the electoral success of Marine Le
Pen in the most recent presidential elections, the French government has moved to adopt a
stricter anti-immigrant/refugee stance.

In 2019, President Macron issued a number of new policies aimed at reducing the
attractiveness of France to low skilled immigrants. This was a two-pronged approach, first they
are attempting to make the country less attractive to low skilled immigrants. The government
began this process by restricting access to healthcare for immigrants by instituting a 3-month
waiting period. They also announced plans to remove all unofficial immigrant camps from Paris.
Macron was quoted as saying. “My goal is to throw out everybody who has no reason to be here
(Onishi, 2019).” This was a move directly related to policy preferences put forth by Le Pen in an
effort to recapture right-wing voters. Secondly, the French government put forth plans to create a
quota system to allow skilled workers into France. Combined these new policies are an attempt
to exert more national control over immigration, and consequently win voters from the extreme
right in subsequent elections.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects RRWPs have on policy agendas of
center-right parties. To achieve this goal, I have asked the question, under what circumstances do
RRWPs effect the policy positions of center-right parties? First, I will consider the role RRWPs’
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success in previous elections has on center-right parties’ ideological positioning. This will also
include an exploration of the roles of system permissibility and government participation on the
part of the center-right party. Answering this question will add to our understanding of the
behavior of political parties and how they react to new challenges from fringe group in various
settings. This study assesses the role RRWPs play in the agenda setting of center-right parties
and how various institutional factors relate to this interaction.

This paper will proceed as follows. First, I will discuss and identify the groups I am
classifying as illiberal. Second, I will review relevant literature and discuss my research question
and hypotheses. This will be followed by a discussion of my methods. Finally, I will describe my
results and discuss the implications they have for the future of party behavior in the presence of
radical right-wing parties.

Illiberal Influencers
I use the term radical right-wing parties as a catchall category for those parties that exist
on the far right of the ideological spectrum. The media would like to label these parties as
populist and move on. However, in reality, those parties who would institute illiberal reform are
a diverse group, of which populism is only one form. While these groups have similar political
goals, their origins and tactics can vary widely.
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Pappas (2016) breaks these parties into three sub-groups: anti-democrats, nativists, and
populists. The populist label is often applied to many of the parties that make up the two other
groups, however they have some distinguishing characteristics that appropriately differentiate
them from the pure populists. While anti-democrats share some of the populists’ preferences for
majoritarianism, they do not necessarily subscribe to the elite versus the people rhetoric the
populists rely on (Pappas, The spector haunting Europe: Distinguishing liberal democracy's
challengers, 2016). Instead they focus more on strategies such as direct election of political
leaders and referenda as a decision-making process.

Nativist parties and movements form in environments which have been largely affected
by immigration, as a response to social change (Pappas, 2016). These groups prey on the public’s
fear that new groups which have entered previously homogenous regions, will begin to change
the cultural makeup of the region. While they are illiberal in nature, these groups are still in
support of democratic institutions; however, they only want those institutions to serve for the
betterment of the national people group. They view outsiders as threats to already scarce
resources and would prefer to practice some form of welfare chauvinism (Marx, P. & Naumann,
E., 2018).

Despite their differences, these three groups do have some commonalities. First, they all
seek to create sharp divides in society. Often, this divide focuses on immigration and the impacts
it has on the native population. Prior to the recent immigration crisis, most countries in Europe
were rather ethnoculturally homogenous (Pappas, 2014) and the arrival of such a large group of
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people from very diverse backgrounds posed a threat to the status quo. This change created an
opportunity for these RRWPs to assert their agenda via the public’s fear of cultural change.

Another attribute these groups have in common is an anti-EU agenda. All three types are
able to focus blame for their pet grievances squarely on this organization. The populists can
frame them and their supporters as elites working against the people, while the anti-democrats
and nativists point to the EU as the organizers of their troubles. To all three groups, the EU
represents the source of polices that integrated economies and cultures throughout the continent.
The EU, then, becomes the focal point for blame due to its programs encouraging the integration
of economies and the acceptance of refugees.

However, disdain for the EU is not solely owned by these RRWP groups. There are
extremist groups on the left who are wary of the consequences of EU membership. Their
grievances, though, grow from other sources of concern, and therefore should have different
consequences for competing parties. Left-wing anti-EU sentiment stems from fear of changes to
the welfare state and the liberalization of the markets. This is in contrast to RRWPs and their
concerns about nationalism and sovereignty (van Elsas, E. J., Hakhverdian, A., & van der Brug,
W., 2016)
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Mainstream response
Given the rise and influence of these RRWPs, how can we expect their center-right
counterparts react to the changes in the political landscape? Will they move further to the right in
an effort to own the issues and recapture lost support? Will they simply ignore the RRWPs in an
attempt marginalize these extremist groups? Or, will they retreat to the center and focus on the
median voter in the face of uncertainty?

Political parties have three main goals: win votes (resulting in influence), hold office and
implement policy (Strom, 1990). Voters choose to align themselves, generally, with political
parties which best reflect their own interests, identity, and have a chance to provide
representation (Cox, 1997). Therefore, a change in a party’s ideological positioning represents a
risky venture by that party’s leadership. A wrong ideological move could alienate a section of the
electorate, resulting in a loss of influence for the party. However, European parties are being
forced to come to terms with shifts in the political landscape that are fairly new and
unprecedented. The rise of RRWPs has forced center-right party leadership to evaluate these
new circumstances and make a risky decision. They must either choose to maintain their current
ideological positioning in the center and risk losing those supporters who would prefer policy
outcomes further to the right or shift their party’s policy position and risk alienating their more
centrist base.

I argue that center-right parties will choose to change their policy positioning further to
the right relative to the electoral threat of the RRWPs with whom they are competing. Much of
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the success RRWPs have achieved has been related to their perceived ownership of the
immigration issue (Abou-Chadi, 2016) and their Euro-sceptic rhetoric (Szocsik, E. and
Polyakova, A., 2019). Therefore, as these RRWPs gain influence, center-right parties experience
increasingly greater pressure to make policy concessions in an attempt to counteract the effects
of the RRWPs’ successes in previous elections. Electoral gains by RRWPs directly impact
center-right parties’ abilities to win votes and gain influence in legislatures in Europe (Szocsik,
E. and Polyakova, A., 2019). Therefore, center-right parties must develop a strategy for
combating their extremist opponents.

Ignoring RRWPs and their platforms is not always a viable option for center-right parties.
RRWPs are effective at politicizing issues important to them, bringing these topics to the
forefront of the public’s attention (Hutter, S., and Grande, E., 2014). Given their success, centerright parties must risk taking stances on these issues put forth by RRWPs. Previous research
indicates it is possible for center-right parties to maintain control of issues advanced by RRWPs,
thus reducing their potential success (Szocsik, E. and Polyakova, A., 2019). This can be achieved
by making concessions such as placing economic and cultural constraints on immigrant
populations (Pardos-Prado, 2015). While these positions may not have been optimal prior to the
ascension of RRWPs, shifts in policy preferences may be necessary for center-right parties to
maintain electoral support.

This process is exemplified by the success, and subsequent loss of support, experienced
by the Danish People’s Party (DPP) in the 2015 and 2019 elections. At the height of the

74

immigration crisis in 2015 the DPP received the second highest number of votes and seats in the
parliament, mostly running on anti-immigrant policies. Their success spurred change within most
of the centrist parties in preparation for the next election cycle, forcing them to add antiimmigrant stances to their manifestos. Their adoption of the DPP’s policy preferences lead to a
restoration of the status quo with the socialists regaining their position as the dominant party in
the government and the worst showing by the DPP in two decades.

Somer-Topcu (2009) argues losses in previous elections predict greater risk acceptant
behavior in subsequent elections on the part of party leadership. Parties typically are reluctant to
modify their policy positions, due to the potential loss of electoral support. This explanation for
risk acceptant behavior is supported by prospect theory. In the face of perceived loss,
people/parties are more willing to accept risks they would otherwise not accept (Vis, 2011). In
this case, losses experienced by center-right parties to RRWPs incentivize risky behavior, such
as promoting anti-immigrant legislation or restricting access to social services for refugees.

These policy shift decisions do not come with ease. Significant change to long standing
policy stances by such large organizations as political parties is quite difficult. As Downs (1957)
argues, parties are not only reluctant to change ideology, but it is difficult to do so. This is due to
the public’s association of that party with certain policy preferences. A shift in a policy as salient
as immigration is inherently risky. Therefore, it is only in extreme conditions that we could
expect a mainstream party to make significant policy changes (Adams, J., Clark, M., Ezrow, L.,
and Glasgow, G., 2004).
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The public requires their parties to be reliable and consistent, adverse to dramatic shifts in
policy preferences (Downs, 1957). Whimsical changes in policy preferences on the part of a
party would dramatically decrease the probability of gaining or retaining office. Given this desire
for consistency and reliability, I argue changes in the ideological positioning of a center-right
party will be highly dependent upon the success RRWPs had in the previous election. As party
leaders feel threatened from RRWPs’ encroachment on their support base, they should respond
with ideological shifts relative to the perceived threat. Therefore, I hypothesize:

(H1): Center-Right parties’ ideological shift to the right will be relative to vote share
earned by RRWPs in the previous election.

Context absolutely matters when decisions are made concerning shifts in policy. The
permissiveness of the electoral system has the ability to impact the choices parties make when
confronted by the arrival of an RWPP. These entrants to political systems impact the electoral
incentives differently based on the likelihood that they will be able to steal legislative seats from
centrist parties. Absent these right-wing influences, center-right parties are not likely to shift
their ideology in either direction along the continuum.

The electoral center of most countries has been developed over multiple iterations of
elections in which dominant parties have been able carve out their own space on the political
spectrum. In Europe, this is typified, generally, by the major parties creating a space within the
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center of the spectrum in which they are fairly similar in the policy options they offer, and those
options are acceptable to a majority of the public (Norris, 2005).

With the development of such a strong center in most European countries, mainstream
parties are incentivized to remain ideologically consistent. Small changes to the left or right
based on voter preferences or other shifts from other parties can be expected, but large shifts in
either direction risks the loss of voters in the next election (Adams, J. & Somer-Topcu, Z., 2009).
Maintaining an ideological consistency provides these parties the best opportunity to maximize
their chances at gaining or retaining office in subsequent elections.

Hypothesis 2: Center right parties will seek to maintain a consistent ideological
positioning when they are not threatened by extremist parties.

A party’s decision-making calculus is not limited to the perceived state of the current
election cycle. They also have data from previous elections to help them determine the reality of
the political environment. Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) find parties are sensitive to shifts in
previous elections, especially those in the same party families. When mainstream parties see a
shift in support for these more extreme parties in their family, they should certainly be motivated
to respond to the shift in voter preferences. However, those changes should be relative to the
strength of those RRWPs. Changes to the party system in which only a small threat from a
RRWP has presented itself should not be sufficient to convince a center-right party to modify its
policy positions.
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As discussed previously, absent a strong threat from a RRWP, center-right parties should
remain risk averse in their policy choices. In this scenario the center-right party faces no
incentive to adopt risky anti-immigrant policies. Doing so would certainly gamble the support
they receive from more moderate voters. However, this incentive structure changes when centerright parties are threatened by a strong RRWP. The choice to modify an ideological stance is
conditioned by two phenomena: the permissiveness of the electoral system and the strength of
the RRWP.

The impact of RRWPs is affected by the electoral institutions under which parties
operate. The strength of RRWPs is much more relevant in those system with lower barriers to
entry into the legislature. This is the case for two main reasons. First, parties in systems with low
barriers to entry are sensitive to the success of other parties in their same family, as this is who
they generally compete with for votes (Adams, J. & Somer-Topcu, Z., 2009). As other parties in
their same family gain traction among their traditional voters, or activate dormant voters, parties
at the center must consider the impact of the success of the RRWP. Too many votes lost to these
extremist groups can lead to seat loss, and therefore, the ability to affect policy.

Second, success in previous elections may indicate a shift in preferences among the
electorate. The response of the public to the arrival of a RRWP can provide a lot of information
to political parties. Strong support for RRWP can send the message that the public supports the
policy positions espoused by the RRWPs. The strength of the support for the RRWP provides
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more certainty to the center-right parties about the true nature of the electorate’s preferences and
allows them to adjust their ideology accordingly for upcoming elections (Monogan, 2012).

Figure 1

Parties in systems with higher barriers to entry into the legislature are not as likely to be
threatened by RRWPs, and therefore, are less likely to shift their ideology in the presence of an
RWPP. Figure 1 shows the pattern of movement of the UK’s Conservative party over the term of
the data. This figure shows, despite right-wing influences such as UKIP, the Conservative party
actually moderated their positioning during this time. RRWPs do not pose a sufficiently strong
threat to parties in such low permissibility systems as to cause them to make significant
ideological changes.
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Hypothesis 2a: Center-Right parties’ ideological shift will be conditioned by the
percentage of votes received by RRWPs in the previous election and the effective number
of parties in the system.

The major parties of most countries have spent a long time carving out their space on the
ideological continuum. In some cases, the ideological differences between these parties is quite
small, resulting in a coalition between the major parties. Germany, for example, often sees a
coalition between the two major centrist parties, the left leaning SPD and right leaning
CDU/CSU. Only rarely do we a see a third party enter a coalition with either of these parties in
the recent past. In the German case the third party is usually the FDP, another centrist party.
These parties have worked hard to maintain a central ideological positioning that is likely to
capture a maximum share of the votes and, in turn, maximize the likelihood of their participation
in government. In cases such as this, electoral competition exists to determine which of the major
parties the public views as being the most competent at managing important issues of the country
(Norris, 2005).

Absent the influence of these RRWPs, center-right parties are free(r) to adopt more
centrist positions, capturing a larger portion of votes. Previous research has shown that those
parties wishing to be involved in the formation of government have a significant incentive to
moderate their policy stances. By maintain moderate positioning in their manifestoes, potential
coalition parties place themselves in a better position to negotiate parameters of a coalition and
make themselves more attractive to coalition partners (Dandoy, 2014). Proximity to the median
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voter and dominant party (if they are not the dominant party themselves) are crucial to the
likelihood a party will be considered for a role in a coalition (Savage, 2014).

Given extant literature indicates a clear advantage to those parties closest to the median
voter; I hypothesize parties will adopt moderate policy positions if their goal is to be a part of the
coalition, even more so if they wish to be the formateur. Therefore, I propose hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3: Center-right parties’ ideological positioning is moderated by their
participation in the government.

However, the arrival of a successful RRWP in the political arena puts the distribution of
the electorate into question. Success at the extreme may signify that there has been significant
shift within the voting populace. The success of these groups presents a challenge to the
mainstream parties of the center-right. They must either maintain the status quo and retain their
current positioning or make a shift to challenge the RRWP by adopting more radical policy
stances. Understandably, the decision to make a such a shift in policy position is a difficult one.

Center-right parties faced with losing votes (and therefore office and policy influence)
due to RRWPs must decide to what extent they will seek more radical policy options. Rightward
shifts in ideology have two potential external consequences the parties must consider. First, they
must balance the potential loss of votes from supporters from the center with the potential votes
they are able to recapture from the RRWP. Too much of an over-correction has the potential to
alienate voters at the center of the continuum leading to a loss of their base support.
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Second, they must consider the impact an ideological change will have on their
attractiveness as a coalition partner. Too much of a rightward shift will make supporters of their
coalition partners uneasy. Savage (2014) indicates those parties who are closest ideologically to
the dominant party increase their likelihood of inclusion in the governing coalition. Therefore,
centrist parties moving away from the ideological center, and consequently coalition partners,
run the risk of finding themselves left out of the government. Given the high stakes
consequences of ideological shifts, I argue that this tradeoff is conditional upon the strength of
the RRWP the center-right group faces.

Variation in the shifts of electorate’s perceived distribution to the extreme provides
different incentives for office seeking parties to move away from the center towards these
extreme positions in an effort to recapture voters (Adams et al., 2006). In those systems in which
RRWPs are not very strong electorally, there is little incentive for the center-right parties to
modify their positioning. The lack of a strong RRWP sends the message to the center-right party
that the distribution of the electorate has not changed and there is no need for the party to make
changes to its policy positions.

However, in those party systems in which a RRWP has been successful in winning votes,
a different message is being sent to the center-right party. In these systems it is clear that there
has been a shift within in the electorate as to their preferences and the center-right party in forced
into a position in which they must decide if they are willing to make policy concessions to the
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supporters of RRWPs. This is a risky trade off party leadership will not take lightly. The decision
to move to the right has the potential to alienate more centrist supporters, and the party risks
losing their support to other parties pursuing more moderate positions. A miscalculation on the
part of the party could potentially lead towards the loss of a governing position, and
subsequently, the ability to enact policy. Therefore, I predict those center-right parties will
become more risk acceptant in the presence of stronger RRWPs due to increased concern of the
potential loss. This will then cause the center-right party to shift its ideological positions further
to the right to compensate for the potential losses.

Hypothesis 3a: Center-Right parties’ ideological positioning will be conditioned by their
role in the government and the percentage of votes received by RRWPs in the previous
election.

Data and Methods
The data for this project come primarily from the Manifestos Project. The Manifestos
data is compiled via analysis of party platforms. While the dataset provides position estimates on
a number of position areas, I utilize only the general left/right scale. The dataset begins in 1945,
however, I limit my data to only those elections since 1994, the year RRWPs were first elected to
national legislatures in Europe. I also limit the dataset to only those countries who are a member
of the OECD, as non-OECD European nations commonly have party bounds associated with
ethnic groups.
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Because I am focusing on the effect RRWPs have on their center-right counterparts, I
have excluded all those parties from the analysis categorized as left-wing. Also removed from
analysis are those parties listed as radical right, as I am not concerned with their placement on
the left/right scale, only their effect on center-right parties. Additionally, this dataset only
includes effective parties, defined as those parties winning seats in their state’s legislature. The
dependent variable in this study is the center-right parties’ placement on the left/right scale as
assigned by the Manifestos Project and consists of two-party families, Conservatives and
Christian Democrats.

There are three explanatory variables used within this study, each measuring an aspect of
RRWP influence. The first hypothesis (the effect of the presence of a rightwing party within the
system) is tested via a dummy variable (1 if there is an effective party, 0 if not). My expectation
for this test is that the presence of an effective RRWP will encourage center-right parties to move
further to the right in an effort to recapture votes.

The second approach to exploring the influence of RRWPs tests the effect the absolute
strength of RRWPs have on the ideological position of center-right parties. In this case the
independent variable is measured as the percentage of votes the RRWP earned in the previous
election. This variable ranges from 0 to 26.91. I, of course, expect to find there is a positive
relationship between the number of seats won by RRWPs and movement of the center-right party
on the left/right scale. Larger wins by RRWPs should incentivize these more centrist parties to
change their public positions in an effort to retain votes and avoid marginalization.
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Lastly, I consider the role of government participation has on center-right party behavior.
This is also a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the party is in government, 0 otherwise. I expect
the impact of government participation will have a leftward influence on center-right parties;
therefore, the sign should be negative. I also control for semi-presidentialism, also a dichotomous
variable in which 1 indicates a semi-presidential system.

This study employs time series cross-sectional models using an OLS estimator. As a
party’s left/right placement in period t are highly correlated with their placement in period t-1, I
include a lagged dependent variable in all models. This lagged variable is included to help
control for serial correlation (Abou-Chadi, 2016). In an effort to control for heterogeneity I
employ a random effects model, controlling for correlation among countries and parties.
Results and Discussion
Model 1 of Table 1 represents a test of the base model of my analysis. The results of this
test indicate support for my first and third hypotheses. The second hypothesis, center-right
parties in more permissible electoral systems will be more ideologically moderate relative to
center-right parties in less permissible systems, is not supported and the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected.
The variable ‘Lag of RRWP vote share’ in Model 1 represents the test of the first hypothesis,
center-right parties will shift to the right relative to the percentage of votes received by the
RRWPs in the previous election. The results do, in fact, indicate center-right parties are
responsive to the success RRWPs have in the previous election. While the coefficient of .445,
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significant at the .1 level, is not as strong as other variables it does show that center-right parties
are aware of RRWP success and are willing to make adjustments to their manifestos in the face
of that success.
-

Table 1

Right/Left Placement of Center-Right
Parties

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Lag right/left placement of C/R parties

0.454
(0.078)***

0.397
(0.076)***

Lag of RRWP vote share

0.445
(0.233)*
0.324
(0.902)
-4.956
(2.813)*

-2.306
(0.762)***
-1.091
(0.943)
-6.324
(2.723)**
0.668

0.448
(0.077)**
*
-0.120
(0.359)
0.195
(0.895)
-8.211
(3.203)**

Effective number of parties (seats)
C/R party in government
Eff. number of parties X RRWP vote share
(lag)

(0.177)***
C/R party in gov X RRWP vote share (lag)

0.938

Semi-presidential dummy

-2.450
(3.049)
2.122
(4.480)
159

Constant
N
-

-1.192
(2.943)
8.538
(4.621)*
159

(0.457)**
-3.370
(3.050)
4.483
(4.580)
159

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
- Standard errors in parentheses

Hypothesis 3, center-right parties’ will moderate their positions if they are members of
the government, is also supported in Model 1. The center-right party in government variable,
with a coefficient of -4.956, is the strongest in this test and this result remains consistent
throughout subsequent tests. Given the strength of this variable, I can draw the conclusion
governing parties are very reluctant to move their ideological position to the extreme. Also, this
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result suggests center-right parties in government prefer to moderate their position, moving
closer to the center of the bell curve. Therefore, they will only move their ideological position to
the right in the presence of a true threat from an extreme party.

Mode 2 of Table 1 represents a test of the hypothesis 2a, center-Right parties’ ideological
shift will be conditioned by the percentage of votes received by RRWPs in the previous election
and the permissibility of the electoral system. The variable of interest in this model is the
interaction of the effective number of parties and the lag of RRWP vote share. Given that the
coefficient for this interaction is positive and significant at the .01 level, I can reject the null
hypothesis and conclude that center-right parties do respond to threats posed by RRWPs when
permissibility is high.
Figure 2
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As demonstrated in Figure 2, one can see the direct positive relationship between the
number of effective parties in a legislature and the ideological movement of center-right parties.
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I argue this shift in ideological preference is due to increased pressure and uncertainty
experienced by political parties in highly competitive electoral environments. Center-right
parties in relatively less permissible systems do not appear to be influenced at all by these
RRWPs. In fact, the results indicate in two party systems, center-right parties faced with a
RRWP, move towards the left, a finding supported by Adams and Merrill (2006).

Hypothesis 3a, Center-Right parties’ ideological shift will be conditioned by their role in
the government and the percentage of votes received by RRWPs in the previous election, is
tested in Model 3. The results indicate support for the hypothesis at the .05 level. While these
parties have a tendency to move towards the center, in the face of a threat from a RRWP, centerright governing parties will move their ideological position to the right.
Figure 3

Figure 3 further describes the impact of RRWPs on governing parties. The range on the
x-axis indicates the minimum and maximum vote shares for RRWPs in the data set. Those
center-right parties in government show a willingness to modify their ideological position that is
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not present in non-governing parties. Given the overlapping confidence intervals, I cannot say
non-governing center-right parties are affected by RRWPs. It seems there is something peculiar
to a center-right party’s placement in government as it relates to ideological decisions when
faced with increasingly powerful RRWPs.

Discussion and Conclusion
This study attempted to assess the effects RRWPs have on policy agendas of center-right
parties. Via time-series cross-sectional analysis of European cases from 1994-2017, I found
center-right parties adjust their ideological positioning in response to RRWP success in previous
elections. However, the data indicate center-right parties are reluctant to make rightward shifts in
their ideology. It is only in the face of increasing electoral permissibility and strong RRWP
threats that center-right parties will move rightward on the scale. Outside of those conditions
center-right parties choose to maintain their ideological positions, or in the case of governing
parties, move to the left.

These findings support the previous of works of Budge (1994) and Adams et al. (2004)
demonstrating a reluctance of political parties to change their ideological positioning. I find only
those parties facing true challenges from extremist parties were willing to make changes to their
ideological positions. Ideological shifts to the extreme represent a risk to parties that under
normal circumstances is unnecessary. However, successful rightwing extremist groups represent
a real threat to the electoral success of center-right parties. This is especially relevant due to the
current circumstances in Europe.
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The case of the Austrian People’s Party (OVP) is a fairly good example of exactly this
phenomenon. Since 1970 the dominant party within Austria has been the Austrian Socialist Party
(SPO) with the OVP often joining them as part of the ruling coalition. However, following the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the mass influx of refugees, extremist groups began to gain
prominence, most notably the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO). Following this initial shock
which caused a spike in the OVP’s position on the scale (seen in figure 4), the OVP began a
trend of moderation. Ostensibly, this was a strategy pursued by the party to maintain their
position within the governing coalition.
Figure 4

The OVP continued to lose ground to the FPO through the remainder of the 1990’s until
the election of 2002. Due to internal struggles within the FPO stemming from its participation in
the government, the party split and the OVP was able to reap the rewards, earning 42% of the
vote in 2002 (Nordsieck, 2019). It was following this election that the FPO was able to regain
traction with the public by refocusing on oppositional tactics and the immigrant Muslim
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population. The success enjoyed by the FPO and its offshoot right-wing party the Alliance for
the Future of Austria (BZO) in subsequent elections, compromised the electoral success of the
OVP. Following the 2002 elections, the OVP lost its status as formateur and only received 34
and 26 per cent of the vote in 2006 and 2008, respectively. It is at this point which we can see the
ideology of the party shift back to the right in an effort to counter the success of the FPO.
Following this shift, the OVP was able to regain control of the government and formed a
coalition with the FPO in 2017.

The real-world consequences of these shifts can be significant to those who reside in
these states; in this case immigrants are the losers. The rightward shift of the OVP and the
inclusion of the FPO in the governing coalition of Austria has had real negative effects on those
non-natives who wish to live and work there. Sebastian Kurz (OVP), the chancellor of Austria
following the 2017 elections and foreign minister prior to them, has taken a hard line against
immigrants living in Austria. During his tenure as foreign minister, Austria closed off its borders
with Turkey, placed a ban on full face coverings, and discontinued government support for
Sudwind Magazine, a periodical focusing on migration, ecology, democracy and human rights
(Der Standard, 2016). These strategies only continued during his tenure as chancellor.

As ideological changes continue throughout Europe, and even globally, it will be
important to continue to study the role extremist parties have on others in their party system.
While this study does not attempt to answer questions about issue ownership or what types of
ideological changes parties make, future research should consider the changes to specific issue
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areas in which RRWPs specialize. This paper has shown that RRWPs do influence center-right
parties, especially those in government. As illustrated by the Austrian example, this can lead to
very real negative consequences for the people impacted by these policy shifts. Therefore,
understanding how these RRWPs affect those in power will be crucial in the coming years.
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Conclusion

This research project explored three facets of the resurgence of radical right-wing parties
in Western Europe. Following the three-paper method, I chose three separate but related topics to
study. I attempted to diversify the focus of the chapters by focusing on three distinct perspectives
of the right-wing movement: immigration, globalization, and party influence. When designing
each of these chapters, I tried to take an approach to the topic that I had not seen, or at least was
not common in the literature. By doing this, I hoped to add as much value to the existing
knowledge of these topics as possible.

The main contribution of the first chapter is related to the testing of submissive
authoritarianism. Most prior work concerning right-wing authoritarianism typically skewed
towards the measurement of aggressive authoritarians (Duckitt et al., 2010). I instead, attempted
to focus on submissive authoritarians. This understudied group is vitally important to
understanding motivations behind RRWP support, as these are the people who do not go out and
protest or carry out violent acts, but instead quietly cast their ballot for extremist parties. As we
see in the third chapter, these less obvious supporters of RRWPs help put them in position to
influence the policy choices of governments.

Chapter 1 does have its limitations. By using existing data, the statistical model was
restricted by the questions available on the ESS. I was able to build sufficient scales to test my
hypotheses, but it is recognized that, with original data, analysis would be improved. Lack of
localized population data was also an issue. More specified data would have helped to draw more
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accurate conclusions surrounding immigrant populations. However, as the population variables
were significant and in the expected direction, I believe they are sufficient to support the
conclusions of the paper.

I would like to extend the research in this paper to study the potential shifting of
preferences of the submissive authoritarians in Germany. There are a number of new research
questions that can be spawned from this study, such as: how long does it take for a new status
quo to be established? At what point do the submissive authoritarians no longer feel threatened
by cultural change due to the presence of immigrants? Once they reach that point will they
change their preferred political parties? The next several years, maybe decades, will provide
plenty of opportunity for the analysis of submissive authoritarians.

The second chapter in this work studies the relationship between globalization and
RRWP support. Globalization is certainly not a new focus of study; there is a wealth of literature
focused on this topic. However, most globalization research that considers its relationship to the
support of RRWPs looks at either immigration as a driver of support4 or the economic
consequences of globalization such as job loss (Arzheimer, 2009). I change the perspective in
this chapter by addressing the cultural threat generated by foreign companies as they expand to
new markets.

The findings of this study support the idea that the presence of foreign businesses is a
negative indicator of RRWP support. This suggests, at least in the French setting, the success of

4

See Shehaj et al. (2019) for an exhaustive list.
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a foreign fast-food company is a good indicator of how well that area supports RRWPs. Higher
numbers of these establishments should correspond with lower support for these extremist
parties. The causal arrow is not defined in this study. It could be that these stores generate
cultural threat that drives support, but it is also just as likely that the owners of these stores know
they are most likely to be successful in areas populated by people with less extremist political
preferences.

This study does leave some questions that future studies could answer more fully. The
generalizability of this study to other countries is uncertain. The importance of food culture to
the French people may not be extendable to other societies. Food culture is certainly important to
most nationalities, but possibly not to the extent that it is to the French. Future work would need
to take into consideration how important food is to the culture of study. Also, the origin country
of the MNC may be important. If relationships between the two societies is hostile, acceptance of
the MNC may be affected and increased levels of threat may be experienced. This study focuses
on food MNCs, but future studies could consider the manufacturing or technology sectors. It
would be interesting to explore the juxtaposition between job creation and cultural differences
introduced by a foreign entity and that area’s preferences for foreign cultures. I think this
research track has a lot of potential and I am excited to explore it.
The third chapter in this work looks at the impact of RRWPs on the center-right parties in
the same political system. I find supporting evidence that shows RRWPs do encourage centerright parties to adopt policy positions further to the right than they would prefer under normal
circumstances. Most other research focuses on two aspects of RRWPs; origins of support5 or

5

See Milner (2021) for a list.
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their ability to impact the seat share of center-right parties (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This study
shifts the perspective by exploring the shifts center-right parties have in policy preference due to
the presence and strength of the RRWPs in the system.

This study is important to the literature as it shows the potential RRWP support has on
policy choices. The results provide evidence that governing parties do shift their policy choices
when confronted by strong RRWPs. The real-world implications for this finding are extremely
important. As these RRWPs increase in strength, the consequences of their influence affect the
lives of real people in a significant way. These findings provide further evidence of the
democratic rollback the Western world has been experiencing that Freedom House has warned
us about.

One drawback to this study is the large scope. This study encompasses all of Western
Europe and most of Central Europe. Future study of this topic should consider the impact of
RRWPs to specific countries. An in-depth case study would certainly be in order. Future study
should also address the long-term impact of the policy shifts enacted by the center-right parties.
Once/if they are able to regain the support lost to these RRWPs, will they revert to the previous
policy positions closer to the center, or will these changes be permanent?
This body of work has contributed to our knowledge of RRWPs, their support, and the
impact they have had on some of the most well-established democracies in the world. I believe
that it is very important to understand these aspects of the current right-wing phenomenon we are
experiencing. The influence of these groups has led to the questioning and mistrust of longestablished democratic institutions, which, if left unchecked, can have significant implications
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for current and future generations. Understanding the mechanisms behind their rise and influence
is important to safeguarding the democratic institutions they threaten.
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